



City of Portland

Terrorism Appendix

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of the City of Portland Terrorism Appendix is to establish a planning and response framework to a terrorist threat or incident occurring within the City of Portland. If efforts to prevent acts of terrorism fail, it is the City of Portland's responsibility to respond in a timely and efficient manner to manage the incident, protect lives, property, and the environment, maintain continuity of operations, recover, and finally return to a state of normalcy.

The complexity, scope and potential consequences of a terrorist threat directed against a large population center requires an extraordinary level of coordination across disciplines, jurisdictions and levels of government.

The purpose of this plan is to:

- Augment the Basic Emergency Operations Plan (BEOP) to address terrorist specific events.
- Outline operational concepts and tasks and to assign responsibilities for preparing for and responding to terrorist incidents that may occur.
- Clarify roles and relationships of city, county, state and federal agencies regarding the threat or actual occurrence of terrorist events.
- Serve as guidance for response to terrorist events.

The BEOP should be referenced for authorities and a comprehensive list of functional annexes, hazard specific appendices and emergency phase chapters.

1.2 Scope

This Terrorism Appendix applies to all city bureaus that may be requested to provide assistance or conduct operations in the aftermath of a terrorist event. While not all bureaus have been singled out in the plan, each bureau has a shared responsibility in ensuring the continuity of essential city services and providing resources to assist in the response to and recovery from the emergency. Although the scope of this Appendix only applies to city bureaus, it acknowledges that a terrorist event requires a coordinated response by a combination of local, regional, state, federal, private-sector and non-governmental entities.

This Appendix is designed to provide a consistent and flexible framework within which government and private entities at all levels can work in a coordinated manner to respond to the event. This Appendix outlines the overall concept of operations for how the City will respond and does not replace the tactical, operational protocols that are the responsibility of the lead response bureau or emergency operations plans of partnering response agencies. (Associated tactical plans for specific types of terrorist acts are

listed in Section 5 under References.) Rather, this Appendix builds on and complements those plans and together provides a comprehensive, multiagency, tiered approach to events that may or may not rise to an incident of national significance.

Parts, or all, of this Appendix may be activated with or without an emergency declaration.

This Appendix does not address cyber terrorism or biological terrorism in detail.

2 Situation and Assumptions

2.1 Situation

The terrorist threat presents significant challenges to the emergency response system. Terrorist acts range from small destructive acts with limited damages and no casualties to a catastrophic scenario utilizing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that causes substantial casualties and major response and recovery efforts. The terrorist incident may present itself with a period of surveillance, preparation and buildup or as a catastrophic event with no advanced warning.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines a terrorist incident as the unlawful use of force by individuals or groups against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political and social objectives.

Portland is vulnerable to hazardous material incidents including fires, spills, leaks, ruptures, container failure and contamination. Hazardous materials incidents can happen along main transportation routes, in rail yards or at material transfer stations. The impact of a release could be on water, air or land and could react differently to the environment depending upon the material. Hazardous materials may be explosives, flammables, combustibles, compressed gases, cryogenics, poisons, toxics, reactive and oxidizing agents, radioactive materials, corrosives and carcinogens. Response and material considerations are listed in the PF&R Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Plan and the US Department of Transportation [2008 Emergency Response Guidebook](#).¹

Portland is susceptible to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive incidents, civil disorder, and terrorism. As a major population center, west coast transportation hub for river, rail and road commerce, the proximity of commercial and residential developments to hazardous materials facilities and as the site of fuel pipeline convergence, Portland is vulnerable to terrorist incidents.

The Portland Urban Area possesses numerous features and facilities identified as potential terrorist targets. The FBI has identified the following sectors within the region that present potential targets for terrorist attacks:

- Water (reservoirs, treatment facilities, distribution infrastructure and dams).
- Transportation (airports, ports, mass transit, bridges, pipelines, highways and railways).
- Telecommunications (fiber optics, information technology and cyber).
- Energy (oil and gas supplies, bulk storage terminals, pipelines and nuclear facilities).

¹ <http://phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/library/erg>

- Natural resources (forests, watersheds, rivers and agriculture).
- Banking and financial institutions.
- Manufacturing (major employers, hazardous materials processing).
- Government infrastructure and public safety.
- Monuments and icons and commercial and cultural facilities.

Terrorist acts involve violations of laws. Therefore, law enforcement agencies engage in prevention activities that serve to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorist threats or acts. Access to homeland security intelligence information is necessarily limited, but significant threats should be communicated by law enforcement agencies to local officials who can implement protective measures and alert the public. Coordination between law enforcement, public safety and emergency management personnel is vital to ensuring appropriate readiness actions are taken, while still protecting law enforcement sources and methods.

In a terrorist incident, the incident area may simultaneously be a crime scene, a hazardous site and disaster area that may impact several jurisdictions. There may be competing priorities in the aftermath of a terrorist act so it is essential that unified command be established to meet incident needs.

Since terrorist acts violate local, state, and federal law, the response to a significant terrorism threat or actual incident will likely include state and federal response agencies.

If the response to a terrorist attack overwhelms local resources it is anticipated that regional, state and federal resources will be requested to supplement local capabilities.

The presence of biological or chemical agents may not be recognized until some time after casualties occur. There may be a delay in identifying the agent present and in determining the appropriate protective measures. Such agents may quickly dissipate or be persistent.

In the case of a biological agent attack, the initial dissemination of the agents may occur outside the local area but still produce victims within the impact area.

The city of Portland Terrorism Appendix is based on the planning assumptions and considerations discussed below.

2.2 Planning Assumptions

Terrorist attacks may be directed at government facilities, public and private institutions, business or industry transportation and individuals or groups. Such acts may involve: arson, shootings, bombings, including use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, or biological agents), kidnapping or hostage taking, sabotage and other activities.

Terrorist attacks may or may not be preceded by a warning or threat, and may first appear to be an ordinary hazardous material incident. Attacks may occur at multiple locations and may be accompanied by fire, explosion or other acts of sabotage.

The FBI will transmit terrorist threat: (1) assessments, to impart facts and/or threat analysis concerning terrorism, (2) advisories, if the threat is credible but general in both timing and target and (3) alerts, if the terrorist threat is credible and specific in both timing and target, to appropriate public safety agencies and the private sector.

The state or local fusion center will gather and analyze terrorism threats and advisories and synthesize that information for use by local agencies. As needed and requested, the fusion center will provide resources, expertise and information and intelligence to public safety agencies and the private sector.

A device may be set off to attract emergency personnel and a secondary device used to injure or kill additional emergency responders.

The attack may be at multiple locations and include multiple events.

Critical medical facilities could become contaminated.

Injuries from a terrorist attack may be both physical and psychological.

Recovery may be complicated by the presence of persistent agents, additional threats, extensive physical damages and psychological stress.

In most cases, significant state and federal terrorist incident response support cannot be provided within the first few hours of an incident. It may take 2-3 days to activate and deploy such resources on a large-scale.

Effective response to the use of a WMD may require:

- Specialized equipment to detect and identify chemical or biological agents.
- A mass decontamination capability.
- The means to treat mass casualties, including conducting triage and using specialized pharmaceuticals that have a narrow window of effect.
- Identification of alternate transportation routes for specified activities such as evacuation, medical transport, emergency response or debris removal.

3 Concept of Operations

3.1 Incident Response

The response to terrorism includes two major functions, crisis management and consequence management which may be carried out concurrently or consecutively. These terms describe the response to an act of terrorism (crisis management) and the response to potential or actual effects of that activity (consequence management).

Emergency personnel responding to a terrorist incident must be protected from the various hazards that a terrorist incident can yield. These include: secondary devices, blast effects, penetrating and fragmenting weapons, fire, asphyxiation, hazardous chemicals, toxic substances, radioactive materials, and disease-causing agents. Though the type of protection required varies depending on the hazard, there are three basic principles of protection that apply to all hazards: time, distance, and shielding.

- **Time.** Emergency workers should spend the shortest amount of time possible in the hazard area or exposed to the hazard. Use techniques such as rapid entries to execute reconnaissance or rescue and rotate personnel in the hazard area.
- **Distance.** Maximize the distance between hazards and emergency responders and the public. For chemical, radiological, and explosive hazards, recommended isolation and protective action distances are included in the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG).
- **Shielding.** Use appropriate shielding to address specific hazards. Shielding can include vehicles, buildings, protective clothing, and personal protective equipment.

Protective actions for the public must be selected and implemented based on the hazards present and appropriate instructions and information provided to the public through usual means of warning and public information. Protective actions for the public may include:

- Evacuation.
- Shelter-in-place.
- Access control to deny entry into contaminated areas.
- Restrictions on the use of contaminated food, normally imposed by county and/or state health agencies.
- Restrictions on the use of contaminated public water supplies, per Water Bureau policy and procedure.
- For incidents involving biological agents, protective actions taken to prevent the spread of contamination might include:
 - Isolation of contaminated victims within medical facilities.
 - Quarantines to restrict movement of people and livestock in specific geographic areas.

- Closure of schools and businesses.
- Restrictions on mass gatherings, such as sporting events.

Such measures are normally recommended and imposed by public health authorities, the incident commander or facility management.

3.2 On Scene Incident Management

The first part of any incident is the response to the 9-1-1 call by the Bureau of Emergency Communications (BOEC). The information of the call determines the resources called to respond. Protocols are established for fire, explosions, injuries and potential terrorist activities. In a local incident, an Incident Command Post (ICP) may be established near, or within a safe distance of, the incident to determine the extent of damage and manage emergency operations at the incident site.

Every event will be unique and dynamic; however, in general the first arriving fire or police responder will assume the role of incident commander and will direct and control responding resources and designate emergency operating areas until a more senior or experienced responder arrives.

Law enforcement will typically serve as the Incident Commander until the scene is stabilized from additional terrorist threats. The Incident Commander, assisted by a staff sufficient for the tasks to be performed, will manage the emergency response near the incident site from an Incident Command Post. If the terrorist attack affects multiple widely separated facilities, separate incident command posts may be established and managed by Area Command.

Typical operating area boundaries established for a terrorist incident may include:

The **Crime Scene Boundary** defines the crime scene. State, federal, or local law enforcement personnel might restrict access to the crime scene. Response activities within the crime scene might require special care in order to protect evidence.

The **Hazmat Boundary** defines the hazmat site, which is referred to in hazmat operations as the “hot zone” and may be termed the “isolation area” or “exclusion zone” by other responders, and may include the hazmat upwind “warm zone” used for contamination control and rescue staging. Depending on the spread of contaminants, the hazmat site may include some or the entire crime scene. Entry into the hazmat boundary is normally restricted to response personnel equipped with personal protective equipment and using decontamination procedures.

The **Incident Boundary** includes the crime scene, the hazmat area, the “cool zone” or “support zone” used for incident support operations such as resource staging and casualty collection, and areas where protective actions, such as shelter-in-place or evacuation, might be recommended or mandatory measures, such as quarantine, imposed. Access to this area is normally controlled; if quarantine is implemented, egress may also be restricted.

Implementation of Unified Command. Once the scene has been stabilized Incident Command will transition to Unified Command to include Fire and Public Health. Typically, as the need for greater coordination of resources and expertise from multiple agencies or jurisdictions evolves throughout the incident, so does the need for unified command. Agencies charged with responding to fire, emergency medical services, law enforcement, and public works have a shared responsibility to manage their resources in alignment with common incident goals and objectives.




Figure 3-1 Unified Command

ICP-ECC Interface. Incident or Unified Command will typically manage tactical field operations at or near the incident site. The Emergency Coordination Center (ECC) supports the on-scene response by facilitating emergency declarations, mobilizing resources, requesting assistance from state and federal agencies, disseminating emergency public information, organizing and implementing large-scale evacuations, coordinating shelter and mass care for evacuees, and providing decision-making support to elected officials.




Figure 3-2 Command and Coordination

3.3 Crisis Management

Crisis management is the law enforcement response to the causes of terrorist incidents, terrorists and their weapons. It includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, isolate, prevent and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The Portland Police Bureau has the lead local role in terrorism crisis management for the City and will coordinate their efforts with state and federal law enforcement agencies as appropriate.

Law enforcement agencies involved in crisis management shall keep those responsible for consequence management informed of decisions made that may have implications for response so that resources may be properly postured for recovery.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is the lead federal agency and will manage the federal crisis management response. Final authority to make decisions on scene regarding the causes of the incident, such as securing the perimeter, identifying and rendering weapons safe and capturing terrorists rests with the FBI's Special Agent in Charge (SAC). FBI personnel will integrate into the Incident Command Post.

Upon notification of a credible terrorist act, POEM will activate the ECC to facilitate the coordination of terrorism crisis management operations.

A Joint Information Center (JIC) staffed by local, state, and federal public information officers will be established to monitor, collect, verify and disseminate information to the public and the media.

3.4 Recovery

Consequence Management (Recovery)

Consequence management addresses the short- and long-term effects on people, property and the environment of the terrorist event. It includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services and provide emergency relief to government, businesses and affected individuals. The agencies responsible for terrorism consequence management operations shall coordinate their efforts with law enforcement authorities conducting crisis management operations.

Until such time as law enforcement and emergency management personnel agree that crisis management activities have been concluded, law enforcement personnel shall participate in incident command or ECC operations to advise those carrying out consequence management operations with respect to protection of the crime scene, evidence collection, and investigative results that may have bearing on emergency operations.

The Emergency Coordination Center will coordinate the City's consequence management response to a local terrorism event for most types of terrorist incidents; however, the Multnomah County Health Officer may be assigned the lead local role in terrorism consequence management for incidents involving public health / mass casualty / mass fatality issues.

Recovery is a complex and long-term process that involves a range of activities and many participants. Recovery actions occur in three general phases. The nature and the severity of the disaster determine the actions in each phase and their timing. The first phase overlaps with emergency response and consists of immediate actions taken to stabilize the situation, reduce life-safety hazards and make short-term repairs to critical lifelines. The second phase provides for ongoing social needs before permanent rebuilding is complete. This phase may continue for weeks or perhaps months. The third phase includes planning for and implementing the rebuilding of damaged infrastructure and the resumption of normal social and economic life in the community and make take months or years depending upon the severity of the event.

4 Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

4.1 General

First responders and government agencies receive much of the attention in this plan, however all City of Portland Bureaus, the private sector, non-government organizations, volunteers and especially the public will likely to be involved during a terrorist incident.

4.2 Duties of All City Bureaus

All City bureaus are accountable for fulfilling their essential functions. Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs) are the responsibility of each bureau. These plans should include, at a minimum:

- Triggers that determine the need for activating the COOP plan and recalling personnel during non-duty hours.
- Prioritization of tasks to guide preparedness, response and recovery activities.
- Procedures to be followed which deviate from normal activities.
- Specific emergency authorities that may be assumed by the designated successor during emergency situations.
- Risk reduction strategies that could be employed pre-emergency.
- Maintenance of vital records.

In addition, all bureaus are required to coordinate activities with the Emergency Coordination Center and should develop procedures for:

- Notifying POEM of an escalating situation that will require the close coordination of two or more bureaus or if additional assistance, beyond traditional mutual aid, is needed.
- Conducting initial damage assessment of bureau resources, facilities and personnel and reporting bureau status and damage information to the POEM Duty Officer or Emergency Coordination Center.
- Coordinating public outreach and information within the joint information system to assure consistent, timely and accurate messages to the public.
- Assigning trained staff to appropriate bureau essential positions, ICP or ECC.

If the FBI, Portland Police Bureau, or state or local fusion center provides notification of a credible threat to the city of Portland or recommends an escalation of the *local* threat level, all city bureaus should (as appropriate):

- Ensure there is adequate staffing for essential functions as identified in the bureau's Continuity of Operations Plan or other emergency preparedness plans.
- Check inventories of critical supplies and reorder if necessary.

- Secure buildings, unused rooms, storage areas, equipment and vehicles to prevent theft, tampering or destruction and implement necessary facility security plans.
- Consider suspending tours of critical infrastructure facilities (Bull Run, etc), and restrict access to city owned or leased buildings.
- Check all equipment and generators for operational readiness; fill city-owned fuel tanks.
- Review critical infrastructure facilities contingency and evacuation plans and brief employees.
- Ensure established mail handling procedures are being monitored and practiced and be vigilant for suspicious mail / packages that may contain a harmful biological agent. What to look for:
 - It's unexpected or from someone you don't know.
 - It's addressed to someone no longer at your address.
 - It's handwritten and has no return address or bears one that you can't confirm is legitimate.
 - It's lop-sided or lumpy in appearance.
 - It's sealed with excessive amounts of tape.
 - It's marked with restrictive endorsements such as "Personal" or "Confidential."
 - It has excessive postage.

What to do with a suspicious piece of mail:

- Don't handle a letter or package that you suspect is contaminated.
- Don't shake it, bump it, or sniff it.
- Wash your hands thoroughly with soap and water.
- Notify Portland Police Bureau.

4.2.1 Mayor or Designee

Provide policy direction for response and recovery operations in the aftermath of a terrorism incident.

- If notified by Portland Police or other law enforcement entity of a credible threat, identify any planned community events where a large attendance is anticipated. Consult with event organizers and consider recommendations from law enforcement whether to cancel the event if warranted by the nature of the threat.
- Declare State of Emergency for the City of Portland and request State of Emergency through Multnomah County.
- Determine what, if any, authorities will be enacted per city code 15.08.020.

- Activate Disaster Policy Council to assess physical, fiscal, and social impact of the disaster and the consequences of policy decisions on the entire city.
- Participate in, or designate representative to, the Multiagency Coordination (MAC) Group to establish priorities for the allocation or re-allocation of critical resources and participate in policymaking for issues / decisions brought to the DPC or MAC Group.
- Establish times for briefings from ECC and coordinate emergency public information through the JIC/JIS to assure citizens and businesses that actions are being taken to respond to and recover from the event.
- Ensure adequate appropriation of financial resources to meet emergency expenses.

4.2.2 Portland Police Bureau

In addition to roles and responsibilities outlined in city code, the Basic Emergency Operations Plan and bureau-specific tactical / operational plans, the Police Bureau will be responsible for the following:

- Ensure employees remain vigilant for spotting suspicious activities, articles, vehicles, and behavior.
- Conduct routine assessments of planned or unplanned large gatherings – consider implementing countermeasures such as restrictions on parking near event site, etc.
- Notify FBI regarding terrorist threat or incident, or make notifications of credible threat to appropriate elected, emergency response and emergency management officials.
- If notified of a credible threat – identify any planned community events where a large attendance is anticipated. Consult with event organizers and facility owners/managers regarding contingency plans, security awareness, and site accessibility and control. Provide recommendation to elected officials whether to cancel the event if warranted by the nature of the threat.
- Ensure personal protective equipment (PPE) and specialized response equipment is ready and available for deployment.
- Secure, control and investigate crime scene and collect and preserve evidence as directed by the FBI.
- In coordination with emergency response partners, identify material involved in the incident, establish initial response and define initial impact area.
- Determine and implement initial protective actions for emergency responders and the public in the vicinity of the incident site.
- Manage crowd control.
- Deploy Explosive Disposal Unit \ Rapid Response Team \ Special Emergency Reaction Team.
- Identify location for and activate incident command post.

- Initiate and facilitate evacuations or shelter-in-place and work with PBOT and ECC to define routes and destinations for evacuees.
- Provide Chief's participation in the Disaster Policy Council or MAC Group and designate appropriate staff to the ECC.
- Coordinate with PBOT to direct and control traffic and access control points.

4.2.3 Portland Fire & Rescue

In addition to roles and responsibilities outlined in city code, the Basic Emergency Operations Plan and bureau-specific operational plans, Portland Fire & Rescue will be responsible for the following:

- Ensure employees remain vigilant for spotting suspicious activities, articles, vehicles, and behavior.
- Ensure personal protective equipment (PPE) and specialized response equipment is ready and available for deployment.
- In coordination with emergency response partners, identify material involved in the incident, establish initial response and define initial impact area.
- Determine and implement initial protective actions for emergency responders and the public in the vicinity of the incident site.
- Initiate and facilitate evacuations or shelter-in-place and work with PBOT and ECC to define immediate routes and destinations for evacuees.
- Conduct fire suppression and search and rescue operations.
- Set up and provide decontamination for emergency responders, victims, equipment and clothing.
- Arrange for special rescue and patient transport needs (burns and other specialized medical injuries).
- Coordinate with Multnomah County Public Health to implement mass casualty and/or mass fatality procedures to transport, treat, track and quarantine (as needed) patients.
- Provide emergency triage, treatment and stabilization.
- Provide Chief's participation in the DPC or MAC Group and designate appropriate staff to the City ECC.
- Identify obvious unsafe structures; restrict access to such structures pending further evaluation by Bureau of Development Services staff.

4.2.4 Portland Office of Emergency Management (POEM) via the Emergency Coordination Center

- Coordinate with the Police and Fire Bureaus to determine appropriate readiness actions during periods of increased threat.
- Provide centralized location for coordination and emergency support function management for the city and its liaisons. Document actions, communications and decisions in WebEOC.
- Facilitate disaster declaration process and coordinate, obtain and track additional resources from regional, state and federal agencies.
- Maintain financial records for expenses incurred during the event.
- Coordinate emergency public information activities through the JIC/JIS.
- Ensure activation of the community notification system, Emergency Alert System (EAS), and other appropriate alert and notification systems.
- Identify populations and special facilities at risk and coordinate protective actions for those special populations and facilities.
- Coordinate with the Red Cross and other non-governmental organizations to provide for mass shelter and housing.
- Coordinate volunteer and donations management operations.
- Coordinate with private sector utility owners to assess damage to critical infrastructure, and prioritize and restore lifelines.
- Activate closest Neighborhood Emergency Team (NET) and assign NET team(s) appropriate missions consistent with their scope of training.
 - All NETs should be (a) prepared to be self sufficient for a minimum of 72 hours and (b) able to provide emergency assistance to their family and immediate neighbors.
- Identify resources available to provide disaster welfare information and assistance, including family reunification.
- Implement Disaster Policy Council or MAC Group decisions and recommendations.
- Plan and manage programs for long term economic and community recovery.

4.2.5 Bureau of Development Services

- Deploy damage assessment teams to conduct building inspections and assess structural integrity of impacted buildings.

4.2.6 Bureau of Emergency Communications (BOEC)

- Provide Director's participation in the DPC or MAC Group and designate appropriate staff to the City ECC.
- Provide dispatch services for emergency calls.
- Provide emergency notifications to key officials.
- Support communications with response agencies.

4.2.7 Bureau of Environmental Services (BES)

- Provide Director's participation in the DPC or MAC Group and designate appropriate staff to the City ECC.
- Perform damage assessment of wastewater infrastructure.
- Prioritize restoration needs of wastewater infrastructure and conduct infrastructure restoration.

4.2.8 Office of Neighborhood Involvement (ONI)

- Operate the City's information and referral line which may assist with providing surge capacity for non-emergency calls.
- Serve as a connection to the community including coordinating assistance for special populations.
- Coordinate with neighborhood associations, community based organizations and emergent volunteers.

4.2.9 Portland Parks and Recreation (Parks)

- Provide facility support to first responders – assess use of Parks facilities for locating incident command posts, bases, camps, helispots, staging areas and / or rest and recovery areas.
- Assess facilities and coordinate with ECC to determine whether sites may be used for staging, points of distribution, evacuation, mass care sites, or alternate city facilities.
- Where Parks facilities are adjacent to hospitals and as appropriate, work with public health officials to provide triage area outside hospital emergency rooms.
- Provide framework for coordinating emergent volunteers.

4.2.10 Bureau of Technology Services (BTS)

- If notified of an increase to the local threat level, increase the frequency of backups for critical information systems and ensure availability of technical support, i.e. systems programmers, technical personnel, redundancy of equipment, off-site storage of critical data, stockpile of critical spare parts, and off-site data recovery site.
- Assess and maintain critical communications and information and technology systems.
- Restore critical public safety emergency systems and networks including computer aided dispatch (CAD), 800 MHz radio system, RegJIN and Fire Records Management System.
- Ensure the City can maintain operability and interoperability with regional, state and federal response organizations.

4.2.11 Portland Bureau of Transportation (PBOT)

- Assist with traffic control and evacuation efforts and limit or prevent access to evacuated or hazardous areas.
- Perform damage assessment of transportation infrastructure.
- Prioritize restoration needs of transportation infrastructure and conduct transportation infrastructure restoration.
- Conduct debris removal.
- Provide for Director's participation in the DPC or MAC Group and designate appropriate staff to the City ECC.
- Coordinate with Police Bureau to direct and control traffic and access control points
- Coordinate with TriMet and other regional or local transportation systems to establish alternate modes of mass transit.

4.2.12 Water Bureau

- Perform damage assessment of water system infrastructure.
- Prioritize restoration needs of water infrastructure and conduct water infrastructure restoration.
- Provide for Director's participation in the DPC or MAC Group and designate appropriate staff to the City ECC.
- Coordinate with the Regional Water Providers Consortium (RWPC) to ensure potable water supply.
- Reassign personnel and resources as required for emergency response and recovery.

5 Direction and Control

5.1 Incident Command

If the incident occurs within the City of Portland and there is no jurisdictional overlap, the incident will initially be managed by an Incident Commander. Direct tactical and operational responsibility for incident management activities rests with the on-scene Incident Commander or Unified Command. Because a terrorist event will typically require the close coordination of multiple agencies – Incident Command will transition to Unified Command. The Incident Commander or Unified Command will be established at an Incident Command Post (ICP). The ICP is the physical location where the tactical-level, on-scene incident or unified command and management organization is located and is generally established in the vicinity of an incident site.

5.2 Area Command

If there are multiple incidents or multiple sites within the impacted area, an ICP will be established at each site or for each event. Each ICP will then report to an Area Command organization. Area Command will oversee the management of the multiple ICPs and has the responsibility for: (1) setting overall strategy and priorities, (2) allocating critical resources according to priorities, (3) ensuring incidents are properly managed, and (4) ensuring operational objectives are met.

5.3 Emergency Coordination Center (ECC)

Whereas Incident and Area Command provide tactical field level direction and control – the ECC serves as a multiagency coordination entity that supports the on-scene response. The ECC is the centralized location to coordinate, collect, monitor and distribute damage information and assess impacts, develop overall strategies and policies in support of emergency response and recovery efforts, coordinate the allocation and management of resources based on incident priorities, document all communications, decisions, activities, and the deployment and tracking of resources and provide coordinated information to the media and general public including issuance of protective action recommendations.

If local resources are insufficient or overwhelmed to respond to the event, the City of Portland may request assistance from other jurisdictions, organizations and agencies. The City will coordinate that request thru Multnomah County, including the request for a declaration of emergency.

5.4 Disaster Policy Council (DPC)

City Code [Chapter 3.125.020](#)² defines the DPC as the City's policymaking body which advises the Mayor on public policy decisions necessary in an emergency event.

During an emergency event, the DPC is charged with providing policy oversight of integrated citywide emergency preparedness activities, initiatives and decision-making guidance in response to emergencies. The role of the DPC is to focus on the overall strategic planning for response and recovery, prioritization of incidents and incident demands for critical or competing resources and development of policy-level decisions for issue resolution.

5.5 Multiagency Coordination (MAC) Group

Whereas the DPC is City of Portland's executive leadership group, determining overarching priorities for the City resources, the Multiagency Coordination (MAC) Group may be convened to manage executive leadership decision making about regional resources. A MAC Group is part of the Multiagency Coordination System and is comprised of agency representatives who have jurisdictional, functional or significant supportive responsibilities in an incident or incidents.

Agency administrators will appoint MAC Group agency representatives through a delegation of authority to commit their agency funds and resources, have authority to speak on behalf of their organization, make decisions for the prioritization of critical resources, resolve issues and propose new interagency policy during an emergency.

Authorities and References

5.6 Integration of Local, State and Federal Response Agency Personnel

As the response effort unfolds and additional resources and personnel are requested to augment existing capabilities, personnel from other local, state, or federal agencies will integrate into the Incident Command Post, Area Command, Emergency Coordination Center and Multiagency Coordination Group to enhance the ability of these organizations to effectively respond to the event.

- the Portland Metropolitan Area Transportation Intergovernmental Agreement (PMAT), Oregon Public Works Emergency Response Cooperative Assistance Agreement and the Oregon Flexible Service Agreement.
- Water Bureau —Agreements with United States Army Corps of Engineers, MCDD, water utilities in Oregon and Washington and other public and private sector agreements for the restoration of water service including Oregon Water/Wastewater Agency Response Network (ORWARN).

² <http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.cfm?c=34255>

6 Plan Development and Maintenance

6.1 Plan Administration

The update of this appendix is the responsibility of the Portland Police Bureau. The Portland Office of Emergency Management will facilitate the vetting and coordination of this appendix with stakeholders and the community. All plans will be reviewed and approved by the Emergency Management Steering Committee and Disaster Policy Council prior to adoption by Portland City Council.

6.1.1 Record of Plan Changes

The Terrorism Appendix will be reviewed and approved every five years or as needed after an actual incident or exercise of the plan. Between the date of Council adoption, updates and revisions to the plan will be tracked and recorded in the following table. This process will ensure the most recent version of the plan will include these changes.

Table 6-1 - Record of Plan Changes for the Terrorism Appendix		
Date	Change Number	Summary of Changes
January 2011	Original Release	

6.1.2 Plan Distribution

Distribution of the Terrorism Appendix will be done electronically using the Adobe Portable Document Format (.PDF) version 8 or later. The Terrorism Appendix will be posted on the www.portlandoregon.gov/oem intranet website. Electronic copies will contain **hyperlinked text** (in blue) that will allow users to immediately jump to other portions of the document or to associated information on the internet. Paper copies will not be distributed but will be available upon request.

7 Authorities and References

Responsibility for responding to emergencies rests with local government. Neighboring jurisdictions and state and federal agencies will not assume authority or responsibility for responding to any emergency incident, including a CBRNE event, unless continuity of operations/continuity of government (COOP/COG) thresholds are met as outlined in the City or local government plan, resources are or imminently exhausted or local jurisdictions request outside assistance. When requested, these agencies will provide support to local command and control as long as it does not impair their own response.

The Terrorism Appendix to the City of Portland's Basic Emergency Operations Plan is issued by the Portland City Council pursuant to the provisions of Title 15 City Emergency Code of the City of Portland; the Charter of the City of Portland, Oregon (Chapter 2; Article 1, Section 2-105 a, 2-206 a,f, g; & Chapter 8, Section 8, 104&105) and Chapter 401, Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS).

7.1.1 Federal

- [Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, PL 100-707](#)³
- [Title III](#)⁴, of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, PL 99-499 as amended
- [Code of Federal Regulations \(CFR\), Title 44](#)⁵. Emergency Management Assistance
- [EO 12656](#),⁶ Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, of November 18, 1988
- [Homeland Security Act of 2002](#)⁷
- Homeland Security Presidential Directive ([HSPD](#)) [5](#).⁸ Management of Domestic Incidents
- [HSPD-8](#):⁹ National Preparedness
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), [National Incident Management System \(NIMS\)](#)¹⁰
- DHS, [National Response Framework \(NRF\)](#)¹¹

³ <http://www.fema.gov/about/stafact.shtm>

⁴ <http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/sara.shtm>

⁵ <http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/cfrassemble.cgi?title=200344>

⁶ <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/EO12656.htm>

⁷ http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/law_regulation_rule_0011.shtm

⁸ http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214592333605.shtm

⁹ http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm

¹⁰ <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/index.shtm>

¹¹ <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/mainindex.htm>

7.1.2 State of Oregon

- Oregon Revised Statutes [401.305 through 401.335](#)¹²

7.1.3 Multnomah County

- Multnomah County Emergency Operations Plan
- [Multnomah County Public Health Emergency Response Plan](#)¹³

7.1.4 City of Portland

- [Title 3 of the City Code – Administration](#)¹⁴
- [Title 15 of the City Code – Emergency Code](#)¹⁵

7.2 References

Bureau of Emergency Communications Standard Operating Procedures 30.10.070,
Mass Casualty Incident

City of Portland, Oregon; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive
(CBRNE) Incident Annex

Multnomah County Public Health Emergency Response Plan

Portland Fire and Rescue, Dispatch Plan

Portland Fire and Rescue Operational Guidelines, Actions for Terrorist Threat
Conditions

Portland Fire and Rescue Operational Guidelines, Mass Casualty Incident and Multiple
Patient Scene

Portland Fire and Rescue Operational Guidelines, Medical Care Points for Hospital
Surge Protection

Portland Fire and Rescue Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Plan

Portland Police Bureau Directive 635.10 Crowd Management /Crowd Control

Portland Regional Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan and Interdependencies
Workshop Summary Report

¹² <http://landru.leg.state.or.us/ors/401.html>

¹³ <http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/health/emergprep/plans.shtml>

¹⁴ <http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.cfm?c=28168>

¹⁵ <http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.cfm?c=28179>

7.2.1 Mutual Aid Agencies and Organizations

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) - Provides legal agreement and standard operating procedures for states to receive interstate aid in a disaster. Passed through Public Law 104-321 approved in 1996.

- Portland Police Bureau – Master Interlocal Agreement with 15 law enforcement agencies, city, county, departments, port, state and federal. Policy 631.30 – Cooperation with other Agencies - File #9894; 1996 empowers law enforcement agencies to request assistance from other units of government listed in the agreement.
- PF&R – All neighboring fire departments as well as the Oregon Department of Forestry.
- PBOT — Written public works cooperation assistance agreements with Multnomah County, City of Gresham and MCDD, Oregon Highway Division and others public works agencies throughout the region.

Attachment I

Terrorist Incident Response Checklist

	<u>Action Taken</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
INITIAL RESPONSE:		
1.	Deploy response forces.	
2.	Activate incident command post to direct emergency operations.	
3.	If Incident appears to be terrorism-related, ensure law enforcement personnel, including the FBI, are advised and respond to the incident site.	
4.	Isolate the area and deny access. Reroute traffic as needed.	
5.	Determine and report:	
	a. Observed indicators of the use of biological/chemical weapons.	
	b. Wind direction and weather conditions at the scene.	
	c. Plume direction, if applicable.	
	d. Approximate number of victims.	
	e. Orientation of victims.	
	f. Types of victim injuries and symptoms observed.	
	g. Observations or statements of witnesses.	
6.	If possible, determine type of weapon used using appropriate detection equipment, response guides, damage characteristics, and casualty symptoms.	
7.	Establish scene control zones (hot, warm, and cold) and determine safe access routes and locations of staging area. Establish initial operating boundaries for crime scene and incident area.	
8.	Implement crowd control measures, if necessary.	
9.	Determine and implement requirements for protective clothing prophylaxis and equipment for emergency responders.	
10.	Establish communications among all response groups.	
11.	Protect against secondary attack.	
12.	Activate all necessary ECCs to support emergency operations.	
13.	Determine requirements for specialized response support.	
14.	Make notifications to state and federal law enforcement and emergency management agencies.	
15.	Obtain external technical assistance to determine potential follow-on effects.	
16.	Request and/or deploy hazardous materials response team, if appropriate.	
17.	Request and/or deploy bomb squad or ATF support, if appropriate.	

Attachment II

SPECIFIC TERRORISM HAZARDS:

I. FIREARMS

A. Overview

Armed attack incidents can include many different scenarios and types of weapons. Harm occurs from physical trauma inflicted from the weapon(s). Terrorists generally utilize weapons that enable them to kill the largest number of persons in the shortest amount of time.

B. Types of Harm

1. **Primary: Mechanical.** Historically the weapons of choice have been semi-automatic pistols, sub-machine guns and military type rifles.
2. **Secondary: Etiological (disease causing).** Etiological harm may come from contact with blood and other bodily fluids.

C. Personnel Protective Measures

1. **Time** - Until the scene has been secured by law enforcement officials, any time spent in the area should be kept to an extreme minimum. Time spent in the unsecured area should only be by trained responders executing clear tactical objectives.
2. **Distance** - Until the scene has been secured by law enforcement officials, responders should keep an approximate distance of .5 to 1 mile from the shooter's location. Determining the exact distance will be based on topography and the individual situation. The point is to utilize distance as much as possible. Be aware that projectiles from high-powered rifles can travel distances greater than one mile.
3. **Shielding** - Shielding from an armed attack can be accomplished by utilizing hard physical cover such as buildings and similar objects. Shielding at an armed attack needs to include both horizontal shielding and vertical cover.

II.

EXPLOSION

A. Overview

1. **Size and Target.** Bombing incidents can involve multiple devices and can range from small pipe bombs to large vehicle bombs. The incident may involve an attack against a fixed target or a group of people and may include secondary devices, booby traps or suicide bombers.
2. **Materials Used.** Materials involved will include a power supply, initiator, explosive, and switch. The detonation may be designed to disperse biological, chemical or radiological materials in addition to fragmentation and shrapnel. The type of bomb involved may be an improvised explosive device or a commercially manufactured explosive.
3. **Detonation Methods.** The bomb may be activated by a timing device or equipped with various switches that can be activated by light, heat, pressure, movement or radio transmission.
4. **Special Considerations.** Bombs are the weapons most frequently used by terrorists. Bear in mind that one of the bomb victims may be the bomber. Be aware that additional bombs and threats may exist after the initial event. Responders should maintain situational awareness and take reasonable precautions against such threats. Always assume there are secondary devices and act appropriately.

B. Outward Warning Signs

1. Responders must remain alert at all times for warning indicators when involved with suspected bombings. Warning signs include:
Abandoned container out of place for the surroundings.
 - Obvious devices containing blasting caps, timers, booster charges, etc.
 - Abandoned vehicles not clearly belonging in the immediate environment.
 - Strong chemical odors with no apparent reason.
 - Unusual or foreign devices attached to pressurized containers, bulk storage containers or supply pipes.
 - Trip wires or other booby traps.
 - An incident preceded by a written or verbal threat.
 - Suspicious mailing containers
2. **Detection Methods.** Detection methods are typically limited to outward warning signs for first responders. However, specialized resources will use techniques such as fluoroscopes, detection dogs, and photo ionization detectors.

C. Types of Harm

1. **Thermal.** This applies to individuals exposed to heat generated by the detonation. It is generally not an ongoing risk unless unexploded materials are present.
2. **Radiological.** If the device was designed to disperse radiological contamination or be detonated in an area containing radiological materials, this will present a continuing hazard.
3. **Chemical.** Chemical hazards stem from products created as a result of the explosive reaction, from chemicals already present at the detonation site, or chemicals have been included in the device for the purpose of being dispersed. All of these potential hazards must be considered by responders.
4. **Etiological.** This will be a primary risk if the device is used as a dispersion mechanism. Otherwise, it is always a secondary risk due to mechanical trauma.
5. **Mechanical.** Mechanical harm can result from blast pressure, high energy, shrapnel and fragmentation.

D. Personnel Protective Measures

1. Time

- **Pre-blast.** Time as a protective measure in a pre-blast situation is improbable. Once detonation starts, harm will occur virtually instantly.
- **Post-blast.** Minimizing exposure time in the affected area will assist in keeping exposure to hazards as low as possible. Work time in the affected area should be kept at a minimum until the area has been evaluated by specialized teams. These teams will search the area for mechanical hazards, unexploded material, radiological hazards, chemical hazards, biological hazards, secondary devices, etc.

2. Distance

- **Pre-blast.** Determining the appropriate distance from a suspected explosive device is difficult. Responders must consider the size and estimated power of the device, topography of the scene and estimation of harm in the event of detonation .US Army Terrorist Bomb Threat Stand-off Guide.
- **Post-blast.** These incidents may involve a large area. Maintaining a proper distance from the affected area until it has been evaluated by specialized teams is imperative.

3. Shielding

- **Pre-blast.** Shielding at the scene of a bombing incident can be accomplished utilizing hard cover such as buildings and other objects. Avoid the line of sight of the scene and avoid windows.
- **Post-blast.** May require the use of personal protection equipment.

E. Implementing Self Protection via Time, Distance and Shielding

1. **Time** - Work time in the affected area should be kept to a minimum until the area has been evaluated by specialized teams. Teams will search the area for mechanical hazards, unexploded materials, radiological hazards, hazardous chemicals, biological hazards, secondary devices, and booby traps.
2. **Distance** The Terrorist Bomb Threat Stand-off Guide provides recommended evacuation distances when dealing with unexploded materials.
3. **Shielding** - If practical, keep out-of-line, out-of-sight, of any suspected devices. Buildings and vehicles may provide some protection.

F. Treatment of Casualties. Casualty treatment follows a standard sequence:

1. Decontamination.
2. Patient management.
3. Transport to medical facilities (hospital).
4. Definitive medical care.

Clothing removed from victims may contain evidence that can be recovered. When cutting clothing from individuals, responders should avoid, if possible, cutting through holes in the clothing created by shrapnel or other materials that can yield evidence. Identify and bag all such materials for laboratory analysis.

III. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

A. Overview

Biological incidents will present themselves as either a focused emergency response or a public health emergency. Materials include bacteria, rickettsia, viruses or toxins. These materials are inhaled or ingested into the body to cause harm.

1. Outward Warning Signs and Detection Clues for the Presence of a Biological Agent. There are a number of outward warning signs and detection clues which can alert the responder to the possible presence of biological agents both prior to an incident and at the incident scene.
 - Verbal or written threats.
 - Suspicious bombing incidents that do not cause much blast or fire damage.
 - Abandoned spray device out of place for the surrounding environment.
 - Container from laboratory or biological supply houses.
 - Biohazard, culture or culture media labels.
2. Detection methods for biological agents. On-site detection of biological agents is currently not practical for most first responders. Typically, samples are collected using various techniques including bioassay, mass spectrometry, gas chromatography, and culture of living organisms.

B. Types of Harm

1. Primary: Etiological. These materials are classified as Class 6 Hazardous Materials by the US Department of Transportation.
2. Secondary: Chemical. Possible secondary hazard (e.g., at the scene of a clandestine laboratory).
3. Secondary: Mechanical. Possible secondary hazard where explosives have been used to disperse the agent.

C. Personnel Protective Measures

1. **Time.** Keep exposure time and product contact to a minimum.
2. **Distance.** Keep an appropriate distance from the actual biological material. Stay up wind, uphill and away from contaminated areas and casualties if you don't have the appropriate protection.
3. **Shielding.** Implementing appropriate shielding in the form of respiratory protection and protective clothing.

D. Proper Self-Protection Techniques

1. Respiratory Protection.
2. Splash Protection (boots and gloves).
3. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) universal precautions including double-gloving.

E. Treatment Procedures for Casualties Should Generally Follow This Sequence:

1. Decontamination
 - Decontamination covers a broad scope of activities.
 - Technical Decontamination refers to decontamination of tools, suits, and other Personal Protective Equipment.
 - Emergency Decontamination of large and small groups.
 - Self Decontamination involves a responder who has been contaminated with a hazardous substance. The responder should remove clothing, decontamination with the appropriate materials, and then cover him or herself prior to seeking medical evaluation. Follow local protocols for detailed instructions.
2. Patient management and triage.
3. Transport to medical facilities (hospital).
4. Definitive medical care.

IV. CHEMICAL AGENTS

A. Overview. Chemical incidents can include many hazardous materials classes. Materials can be inhaled, ingested, absorbed, or injected. Materials can include industrial, chemical, or warfare type agents.

1. Nerve agents are some of the most toxic known chemicals. They are hazardous in their liquid and vapor states and can cause death within minutes of exposure.
 - a. Outward Warning Signs include observation of symptoms such as miosis, runny noses, difficulty breathing, and uncontrolled muscles and bodily functions. Victims may possibly report a fruity odor.
 - b. Detection Methods.
 - Detection papers such as M8 or M9.
 - Colormetric tubes.

- Military detection kits.
 - Pesticide tickets.
 - Electronic meters.
2. Vesicants (blister agents) cause red skin (erythema), blisters, irritation, damage to the eyes, to that of a corrosive chemical like lye or a strong acid.
- a. Outward Warning Signs include observation of blistering, redness of skin, irritation of eyes, cough, and shortness of breath. Victims may report an odor of garlic or mustard. Lewisite has been reported to smell like geraniums.
 - b. Detection Methods:
 - Detection papers such as M8 and M9.
 - Military detection kits.
 - Colormetric tubes.
 - Electronic meters.
3. Cyanides or blood agents include common industrial chemicals such as potassium cyanide, which can cause rapid respiratory arrest and death.
- a. Outward Warning Signs include victims showing great difficulty in breathing and onset of cardiac symptoms. Some victims may report an odor of bitter or burnt almonds.
 - b. Detection Methods:
 - Military detection kits.
 - Colormetric tubes.
 - Electronic meters.
4. Pulmonary or choking agents include common industrial chemicals such as chlorine, which can cause eye and airway irritation, dyspnea, chest tightness, and delayed pulmonary edema.
- a. Outward Warning Signs include observation of pulmonary distress among victims. They may also report odors such as chlorine, bleach or swimming pool odors (chlorine) and the odor of newly-mown hay or grass (phosgene).
 - b. Detection Methods.
 - Military detection kits.
 - Colormetric tubes.
 - Electronic meters.

5. Irritants or riot control chemicals such as pepper spray cause burning and pain on exposed mucous membranes and skin, eye pain and tearing, burning in the nostrils, respiratory discomfort, and tingling of the exposed skin.
 - a. Outward Warning Signs include observations of classic 'tear gas' symptoms among victims. They may report multiple odors including hairspray and pepper due the variety of propellants used to dispense these agents.
 - b. Detection. There is no detector. The means of identification is by locating and collecting residue for laboratory analysis.

B. Types of Harm

1. Primary: Chemical - Chemical hazards, of course, include a wide variety of effects including corrosive, reactivity, and a variety of systemic effects which may attack the central nervous system, cardiovascular system, respiratory system and other bodily functions.
2. Secondary: Thermal - Many chemical reactions create heat. Also, the chemicals involved may be flammable.
3. Secondary: Asphyxiation - Some chemical reactions may deplete oxygen or create gases that displace oxygen.
4. Secondary: Mechanical - Corrosive chemicals like strong acids can weaken structural elements.

C. Personnel Protective Measures

1. **Time.** Keep exposure time and product contact time to a minimum.
2. **Distance.** Keep an appropriate distance from the actual chemical. Stay up-wind, uphill and away from contaminated areas and casualties if one doesn't have the appropriate protection.
3. **Shielding.** Implement appropriate shielding in the form of respiratory protection and protective clothing.

D. Self Protection

1. Nerve agents.

Follow ERG 2004 Guide 153. Do not make entry into confining environments unless you have been appropriately trained and have the necessary equipment. Use time, distance and shielding to your maximum advantage.

- Antidotes to nerve agents include Atropine and 2-PAM Chloride.

2. Vesicants (Blister Agents).

Follow agency procedures for operating at the scene of a hazardous materials incident. If the material has not been positively identified but vesicants are suspected, follow ERG 2000 Guide 153. Do not make entry into confined spaces unless you have been properly trained and have the necessary equipment. Use time, distance and shielding to your maximum advantage.

3. Cyanides (Blood Agents).

Follow agency procedures for operating at the scene of a hazardous material incident.

- If the substance has been positively identified as Cyanogen Chloride, use ERG 2004 Guide 125.
- If the material is positively identified as Hydrogen Cyanide, use ERG 2004 Guide 117.
- If a blood agent is suspected, but not positively identified, use ERG 2004 Guide 123.
- There is an antidote kit for blood agents called the Pasadena Cyanide Antidote.

4. Pulmonary (Choking) Agents.

Follow agency procedures for operating at the scene of a hazardous materials incident. If the material has been identified as Chlorine, use ERG 2004 Guide 124.

- If the material has been identified as Phosgene, use ERG 2004 Guide 125. If a choking agent is suspected, but has not been positively identified, use ERG 2004 Guide 123.

5. Irritants.

Follow agency procedures for operating at the scene of a hazardous materials incident. For tear gas or pepper spray, or for unidentified irritants, use ERG 2004 Guide 159.

- If Mace is identified, use ERG 2004 Guide 153.

E. Treatment of casualties. Casualty treatment follows a standard sequence:

1. Decontamination.
2. Patient management and triage.
3. Transport to medical facilities (hospital).
4. Definitive medical care.

V. INCENDIARY DEVICES

A. Overview

Incendiary incidents involve flammable devices that are either stationary or hand-thrown. Incendiary devices are used in approximately 20-25% of all bombing incidents in the United States and can include many different chemicals and flammable or explosive devices.

1. Outward Warning Signs and Indicators of Incendiary Use. These are similar to the detection clues for arson investigations and include:
 - Prior warning (phone calls).
 - Multiple fire locations.
 - Signs of accelerants.
 - Containers from flammable liquids.
 - Splatter patterns indicating a thrown device.
 - Fusing residue.
 - Signs of forced entry to the structure.
 - Common appliances out of place for the environment.

These clues should simply be a signal for the responder to take appropriate precautions to safeguard themselves and the public and to start considering the incident as a potential crime scene.

2. Detection Methods. Various methods of detecting chemical residue indicating incendiary use are available including: Colormetric tubes, combustible gas meters, flame ionization detectors, trained dogs, and photo-ionization detectors.

B. Types of Harm

1. Primary: Thermal.
2. Secondary: Asphyxiation. Asphyxiation is always a possibility due to the fact that burning depletes oxygen.
3. Secondary: Chemical. The incendiary material may release a chemical hazard or other fuels present may generate chemical hazards.
4. Secondary: Mechanical. Secondary from structural damage, a thrown devices or secondary events or explosions.

C. Personnel Protective Measures

1. **Time.** Keep exposure time in the affected area and product contact time to a minimum.
2. **Distance.** Keep an appropriate distance from any chemicals. Stay up wind, uphill and away from contaminated areas and casualties if one doesn't have the appropriate protection.
3. **Shielding.** Implement appropriate shielding in the form of respiratory protection and protective clothing.

D. Self Protection

1. Approach the scene utilizing appropriate personal protective clothing equipment.
2. Do not handle any suspicious device.
3. Avoid vapor clouds, mists, and liquids.
4. Call for technical assistance.

E. Treatment of Casualties

1. Consider decontamination.
2. Patient management.
3. Transport to medical facilities (hospital).
4. Definitive medical care.

VI. NUCLEAR DEVICES

A. Overview

Terrorist nuclear incidents are most likely going to involve the use of an explosive dispersion device or any other means to spread nuclear materials. Intelligence sources report that the use of a nuclear fission device to cause a nuclear detonation is highly unlikely. Identifying a nuclear incident may be difficult due to the fact that radiation cannot be detected by physical senses and symptoms of radiological exposure are generally delayed for hours or days.

1. **Outward Warning Signs and Detection Clues.** Outward warning indicators include placards, labels and specialized packaging such as lead containers. Responders should be well-acquainted with the standard radiation warning symbols and hazardous materials containers. For additional information, check the North America Emergency Response Guide (ERG 2004).

2. **Detection Methods for Nuclear Contamination.** Electronic equipment will likely be the only means of testing an area for radiation. Properly trained responders should survey any incident scene with radiation detectors following a suspicious explosion or terrorist threat.

B. Types of Harm

1. **Primary: Radiological.** Due to the nature of radiological materials, this will present an ongoing hazard, the scope of which will only be determined when the amount and identity of the substance involved is ascertained.
2. **Secondary: Chemical.** Many radiological substances are also chemical hazards. This is an area that may be overlooked by responders concentrating on radiation effects.

C. Personnel Protective Measures

Radiological detection equipment is the best method to determine if your self-protective measures are effective and appropriate.

1. **Time.** Spend the shortest amount of time in the suspected contaminated area.
2. **Distance.** Keep an appropriate distance from the suspected contaminated area. The ERG 2004, page 161, section on radiological materials recommends to isolate the area for at least 25 to 50 meters (80 to 160 feet) in all directions and to stay upwind.
3. **Shielding.** Implementing shielding at the scene of a radiological incident can be accomplished by utilizing physical objects such as buildings. The penetration effects of radiation are dependent upon the type of material and the nature of the radiation emitted. As a rule of thumb, keep as much mass between the responder(s) and suspected radiological materials as possible.
4. **Avoiding Internal Contamination.** Do not eat or drink in any area with a suspected or confirmed radiological hazard.

D. Self Protection. Implement personal protection through time, distance and shielding.

E. Treatment Procedures Sequence for Casualties (General):

1. Decontamination.
2. Patient management.
3. Transport to medical facilities (hospital).
4. Definitive medical care.