SUMMARY OUTLINE: An Analysis of Citizen-Participation (CP)

TO: Alan Webber
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    Portland
FROM: Russ Dordero
FOR: Mayor Neil Goldschmidt & Staff

I. Basic Questions:
   A. What is citizen-participation (CP)?
      1. cooptation
      2. mobilization
      3. the delivery of services (product)
      4. the politicalization of citizens (process)
   B. Who are the citizens?
      1. whites/non-whites
      2. middle-class/non middle-class
      3. home-owners/renters
      4. young/elderly
      5. white collar/blue collar
      6. professionals/non-professionals
   C. Who benefits?
      1. The Mayor and his administration
      2. The city council
      3. The image of Portland
      4. The neighborhoods via improvements
      5. Social interaction among citizens
      6. Establishment of planning values

II. CP is different things to different people:
   A. Perspectives on CP vary with the type of informants -
      i.e., their role in relation to CP and the directness
      of their contact with CP in the neighborhoods
      (see Appendix 'A')
   B. Answers to the questions I-A, B, & C, therefore vary
      according to these differences: CP evokes different
      definitions and responses (pro & con) depending upon
      one's initial assumptions about its purpose.
C. There is a polarity between the views and definition of CP between those who see it from city hall and those who experience it in their own neighborhoods.

D. These different perspectives include some of the following variables:
   1. a city vs. neighborhood view
   2. professional values vs. experiential values
   3. planning values vs. social interaction values
   4. central planning vs. local control
   5. city hall vs. the 'locals'
   6. power cliques and hidden agendas

III. CP is a self-fulfilling prophecy:

A. CP evokes a series of self-fulfilling or circular definitions

B. CP is what one finds and/or defines it to be - it is a matter of
   1. initial prejudices and/or assumptions
   2. you see in it what you want to see in it
   3. the results of CP are processed through a screen of selective perception

C. CP as a tautology: CP has x,y,z characteristics, therefore as long as conditions a,b,c exist, which promote such characteristics, then CP is viable and a success

D. CP as product and/or process
   1. Neighborhoods view CP primarily as a process
   2. Administrators view CP primarily in reference to the final product
   3. Process = social interaction among neighborhood residents
   4. Product = e.g., buildings rehabilitated

E. The low level of conflict between the administrators and the neighborhood activists, that is an uneasy 'truce' to play by the 'rules of the game' set by city hall, results from their different perceptions of CP. Each group, city hall or the neighborhoods, get something different out of CP based upon their divergent expectations and interpretations of CP
   1. Ambiguity is hence a hedge against conflict
   2. Ambiguity functions to produce this equilibrium as long as each side gets its view of
CP reinforced.

3. The contradiction in conceptions of CP will only become a threat to equilibrium when
   a. one side does not sense a benefit and/or
   b. one side attempts to impose its conception of CP on the other.

4. Equilibrium is achievable because
   a. product goals of the administration are long-term, hence gratification or accountability is deferred
   b. process goals of the neighborhood are so ambiguous and experiential, hence they depend upon intuitive and personal (subjective) verification (not objective standards)

IV. The ethical questions of CP:
   A. The definition of CP hinges upon a crucial ethical issue - how powerful (i.e., involved at what level) are citizens to be in planning the future of their own neighborhoods?
   B. Is CP a primary or secondary level power, i.e. decision-making experience?
      1. dependency
      2. self-sufficiency
   C. Models of community power
      1. pluralist - interest groups
      2. elitist - power elite
      3. decentralized power - participatory democracy
   D. Power values
      1. efficiency
      2. product
      3. process
      4. veto

V. The 'dialectic' of CP
   A. cooptation vs. mobilization
   B. product vs. process
   C. efficient central administration vs. neighborhood power
   D. equilibrium vs. social change
   E. CP is a part of Portland’s political 'equilibrium' - it is beyond dismantling
   F. CP exists as a continuum of types of power and political interaction
1. Continuum of CP power:

 inactive    active    self-sufficient
 dependent   coopted   neighborhood power

2. Implications:
   a. CP as community power implies a total rethinking
      of the purposes of power, a re-education of how
      and why to use power, a revising of working
      schedules, and re-definition of the why of social
      involvement;
   b. The centralized direction of CP is both realistic
      in the status quo but also allows for divergent
      values to be shared.
   c. The current 'active'-'coopted' system in Portland
      (b above) however does bring with it eventual
      contradictions and has inefficiencies of scale
      and time

VI. Policy problems & options:
   A. The role of the Mayor: Goals & Conceptions of CP
      - Intra-Portland
   1. Clarification about CP
      a. The mayor is both uniquely gifted and situated
         to articulate his commitment to CP and to defend
         it
      b. CP is strong enough to withstand a new adminis-
         tration, pro or con, CP
      c. Mayor is perceived as asking citizens to 'trust
         me' as the means of handling problems that arise
         with CP
      d. The resulting 'carrot and stick' approach hides
         the reality that not enough monies are available
         to really meet public expectations
      e. Social, economic, racial bias to CP
      f. How does comprehensive planning mesh with neigh-
         borhood power?
      g. Does CP imply decentralizing power or simply a
         more efficient way of administering programs in
         behalf of citizen's assumed best interests?
B. Role of the Mayor: Outside of Portland
   1. Use of regional and national visibility to articulate urban issues and their national context
   2. Exploit the potential of a Carter presidency
C. Administrative Problems affecting the viability of CP
   1. Overlapping bureaucratic jurisdictions
   2. Bureaucratic immobilism
   3. Bureaucratic complexity and redundancy confuses citizens, result is
      a. inefficiency
      b. alienation
      c. using agencies one against another
      d. CP and administrative morale
      e. program delay
   4. Agency conflict then must be negotiated by mayor and/or council
   5. HCD has not proved it can meet the housing needs of middle or lower class
   6. Clarification of the administration's goals within the agencies involved in CP would probably reduce overlapping and conflict
   7. Such clarification might also avoid issues arising that need mayoral and/or council adjudication
   8. Once coordination between bureaus involved with CP is achieved less confusion to citizens will be transmitted, the fragmentation of policy be reduced, and negative politicalization avoided.
D. Continuity of technical staff in the neighborhoods
   1. Staff expertise = developing neighborhood expertise
   2. Educational function of staff hampered by sporadic commitment of staff resources
   3. Is the staff the resource of city hall or the neighborhoods?
   4. Conclusion: the problem of continuity of staff is probably the most important issue I have isolated relative to what neighborhoods need in order to make wise planning decisions. The lack of continuity results in
      a. slow delivery of services (product)
      b. lowering of citizen morale
      c. slowing down the process of building citizen expertise
      d. a,b,c result in cumulative inefficiency
E. The Jamming of information flow to citizens
   1. Information overload leads to
      a. citizen confusion
      b. citizen frustration
      c. citizen alienation
   2. Biases the tendency already extant for citizen activist to be middle-class professionals
      who have the training to deal with complexity and planning issues
   3. Question: when problems arise - where in city hall does one go to and/or where within the neighborhood does one go?

F. Bureaucratic paternalism toward CP participants
   1. By emphasizing product over process criteria
      some administrators may give the impression that they are insincere when dealing with citizens - that all they want to do is to coopt citizens for their own grand plans - which remain hidden by 'expertise' i.e. the language of the 'planner'.
   2. On the other hand, citizens by emphasizing process over product leave themselves with an escape clause to which they may retreat when their own plans they have worked on with city help are not successfully implemented.
   3. The above imply the need for bureaucratic accountability which is the mayor's and council's duty, and citizen responsibility which can only be had when they are fully informed, politically and economically empowered - forced to be accountable.

VII. Policy Options - Models of CP
A. The status quo - preserve it
B. Reorganize the status quo - for more efficiency
C. CP as community power: establish mini city hall
D. S.O.M. plebiscite process plus mini city halls
E. Some mixture of A through D
F. Charter change - commission government to executive-legislative government
August 7, 1976

TO: Alan Webber
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Office of The Mayor
Portland

FROM: Russ Doniero
FOR: Mayor Neil Goldschmidt & Staff (Bonner, Caps, Pederson, Stout)
RE: An Analysis of Citizen-Participation (CP) in Portland: Impressions of - Corbett-Terwilliger, Inner Southeast Coalition, and Arterial Streets

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Citizen Participation - something that if it did not exist would have to be invented

Politics - the art of the 'impossible'

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I. PREFACE:

This study of citizen-participation (CP) involves my effort to learn as much about CP in the brief span of time of ten weeks as is possible in order to develop an 'impression' of what it is, who is involved, and what it all means. My primary means of being educated, I mean that quite literally, by those I talked to and watched was the interview method. I interviewed 36 people involved in the process of CP in Portland from people in the neighborhoods, to citizens on advisory boards, to staff people within city government, and finally the mayor and his immediate staff. These interviews took anywhere from one-half hour to three hours. Most subjects were kind enough to give me as much time as I felt I needed - this usually meant around two hours. In addition to the interviews my angle of vision was supplemented by watching the city council in both regular and informal session; by visiting the Inner SE Coalition executive committee; by listening to the NW District association executive board; by watching in person the closed-circuit televised Corbett-Terwilliger planning committee meeting; and by canvassing the SE area during the mayoral race in May. Other supplementary data and impressions were gathered from reading the Oregonian and Journal plus from reading a host of public and private documents dealing with participation of citizens in the planning process in Portland and elsewhere. My own teaching in urban affairs over the years also helped
in being familiar with the literature in this field. Finally being a TV addict also helped since local media coverage of the city's politics and neighborhood affairs is quite good. The Mayor's appearances on KGW's 'Open Line' was also an insightful media event.

But my primary loyalty is to the 36 informants (victims?) who allowed me to visit with them in my own rather open-ended and unstructured way. I know they taught me more than this report will reflect. I hope my questions somehow helped them in the process to rethink their own conceptions and commitments.

Finally, this report is just what I contracted with Alan to produce - an impressionistic analysis of CP in three programs in Portland: 1-the Inner SE Coalition effort on HCD; 2-the Corbett-Terwilliger effort on planning; and the city's Arterial Streets program.

Therefore, I make no academic pretentions about this report being objective or complete. And I take full responsibility for the analysis and conclusions. As will be noted my faith in people has been rekindled at a time when it is 'in' to be cynical about grass-roots politics given what we have gone through in the country since 1954.

But I want to thank all who helped in the process, especially 'the 36' who shall remain anonymous as I promised.

II. THE ISSUES:

There are three basic questions that must be asked about CP in the planning process: 1-what is CP; 2-who are the citizens; and 3-who benefits from the process of CP?

In the process of talking and watching over the last ten weeks it became very clear that the answers to each of these questions vary with the person to whom I addressed my questions and their position within the process (see appendix 'A'). It also became obvious that such an analysis cannot be separated from the general relations people have with their local government, be they positive or negative. Hence the discussions took on a general character rather than being specifically related to a particular program or neighborhood effort. CP evokes a host of experiences to which people refer which were broader than my initial inquiry presumed. It was the total web of these experiences that I had to know about if I really was to 'understand' CP. Hence my report will not segment comments into a discussion about discrete neighborhoods and/or programs. I will try to relate my comments to the
historical and experiential web of activities from which all my informants based their comments. However, the fact that CP in the three programs cited above cannot be disconnected from the total effort within Portland on this and many other political fronts is itself an important finding and one I did not anticipate when first undertaking this inquiry. Therefore while the basis of my comments will be directed primarily to those specific programs, and by implication they serve as the factual or empirical limit of my study and evaluation - the 'beauty and/or beast' of CP is larger than its particular manifestations. This premise is fundamental to understanding the forthcoming analysis of CP.

III. A CAVEAT ON SELF-FULFILLING THEORIES:

In my interviews I found it to be generally the case that the closer a person was to actual CP input into the political process of planning, the more faith was elicited in the conception of citizen involvement. This makes for a type of self-fulfilling prophecy. For those expressing skepticism about non-elected people and non-expert people being part of a complex decision-making process tend to be those upon whom the non-expert citizen is dependent. Hence CP tends to succeed as a process primarily - in the eyes of the non-expert, the non-official, whereas its failings are pointed out more frequently by the expert, the administrator, who sees the product potential hampered by the CP process. Hence not only the definition of CP changes with the type of informant, but the evaluation of success does as well since the criterion for each group tends to differ. Finally, what emerges from these rather different points of emphasis on CP and a different commitment to CP is not immobilizing or polarizing conflict - there are exceptions - but generally what emerges is an uneasy but implicit truce negotiated by all parties to not rock the boat, too much. Why? Because they each realize that regardless of their differing views of CP - each needs the other's skills and knowledge - a sense of mutual dependence has developed. But the danger in this is that as a circular argument seemed to implicitly emerge in favor of CP - regardless of one's definition - CP by definition could not fail, or at least be admitted to be failing or seriously compromised. Hence each participant in CP is buttressed by his own conception of CP as long as that conception goes unchallenged or is not shattered by experience. More on this later. A curious and even contradictory silence becomes the basis for consent to CP.
IV. CP - WHAT IS IT; WHO IS IT; AND WHO BENEFITS FROM IT?

The answer to each of these questions varies with the type of person with whom one is talking. Generally, active citizens at the neighborhood level, who are non-experts in the planning process, and who are not elected officials tend to see CP as a ‘process’ whereby citizens in the local neighborhoods, who wish to be, can be involved in basic decisions that affect them directly focusing on the planning process. They see themselves as ‘the’ activists who represent symbolically all the neighborhood, those who show up for meetings and those who do not. In fact, more than one person with whom I talked emphasized that the ebb and flow of CP not only brings in a variety of people within its bounds, but that information is shared, decisions are made, people are polled on an informal basis - therefore simply looking at CP as those who attend meetings is a misconception - some are actively involved, some are vicariously involved, some come in and out of the process when their issue surfaces or they have time/interest/energy, and some simply aren't interested enough - so don't worry about them. This latter group and its apathy or lack of information bothers me and I'll have more to say about it later. That is, how to get the apathetic and uninformed involved.

On the other hand, the experts, the elected officials, the persons on city-wide boards dealing with CP at the city-wide level tend to see CP as a process whereby citizens (as described above) are brought into the decision-making network at some point as informants and secondary level decision-makers - but the final distinguishing mark of success is not participation but results - a product - be it a comprehensive plan in C-T or HCD monies expended for rehab in SE.

One gets the feeling that among this second group while the process (CP) is now a mandated and accepted part of the decision-making network in Portland, the result of the current administration’s efforts and federal requirements, the proof of the pudding is in product, results. One senses that while the rhetoric of commitment to CP is there, the real hope is that what will result is a more efficient mechanism for coopting citizens to the point that they will see the wisdom of the planners, the politicians, the larger city interests. The conception that CP could lead into independent, not dependent, relationships between city hall and the local neighborhoods is avoided, evaded, or simply not seen.
Without being argumentative at this point, the above generalizations seem important since they explain the commitment all sides have to CP - which is in a sense non-polarizing since nobody communicates that each of the two conceptions are mutually exclusive if taken to their logical conclusion. But few have admitted of the connection, hence possible conflict is avoided.

But were the parties involved to see the issue as one of community power (in the neighborhoods) versus community cooption by the city (of the neighborhoods) - conflict would arise. This seems in part to explain why Corbett-Terwilliger is more recalcitrant as an entity than other local units - for good or bad - they have seen the dichotomy. Some will argue that the sense of the dichotomy in C-T is simply the 'halo effect' from the days of urban renewal, i.e. South Auditorium, others will argue that nothing has really changed, just the rhetoric and personnel. But the potential for conflict is there and C-T is witness to it - regardless of one's conclusions and/or analysis of why.

I also at this point will assume either mode - community power or community cooption - are equally viable modalities through which problems can be solved and decision can be made. One can also argue that either are equally capable of articulating the 'public interest' - of course depending upon what theory of public interest one focuses - pluralist, elitist or community power theory. Again, it all goes back to the purpose of the initial organizing effort - process or product? As will be discussed later, it is an ethical issue as well as an administrative one (politics = the ethical administration of the public good).

Therefore, the question - CP - what is it, who is it, and who benefits from it? - cannot be answered with finality. It depends upon one's initial commitment and preconception of what government stands for and what it can do. It is an ethical, not merely administrative issue. Or in another sense, to raise the question at all is to raise the basic political question - CP is whatever you want to make of it and your evaluation is preconditioned by your initial premises - goals, vision, ideals, etc.

Hence I am forced to go back to some comments I made in my initial memo on March 16, suggesting what I might do in my internship.

If, CP involves an administrative and/or political effort to get more citizens involved in the decision-making process, then the question becomes on what ideological premises is this done? Is government in Portland trying to simply achieve a more efficient
and more adequate system for solving problems, for example? If so, then getting citizens involved achieves this to the degree that by being involved they feel local government is efficacious and working in their interests. This becomes efficient for as many have discovered - such involvement often results in citizens coming to the same view of the public good as would the planners acting on their own (the S.O.M. option demonstrates this - see section on 'options'). The efficiency is brought out when citizens cooperate with local government in the planning process and when their representatives, elected or non-elected, usually both, arrive at consensus.

This avoids conflict which itself produces the most inefficient aspect of government. Conflict through participation is muted, is managed, and or is coopted - either way the disruptions caused by civil disobedience, by court action, and/or by public hearings not part of the normal routine is avoided. Conflict by being routinized through CP creates efficiency, not the opposite. It also alerts planners and elected officials to problem areas before they boil over. Finally, it includes an expertise in the local neighborhood unit that is necessary for adequate planning to take place. That is, the expertise of those whose ox is potentially being gored. By getting local feedback now rather than later, the process by definition is more efficient. CP by establishing visible neighborhood representatives also routinizes conflict in an efficient manner - officials know to whom to go, as do local people with a gripe. A CP unit may even deflect a potential opponent of city hall's to the local neighborhood unit instead and eventually make a critic part of the process - coopting him. Conflict routinized, is conflict made benign and efficient. At least from this perspective.

However, if CP involves another conception - not dependency but the creation of an ethos of self-sufficiency at the neighborhood level - then another conception of democracy is involved. The implicit notion here is the devolution of power away from the center - city hall - to the local neighborhood. Here the goal of CP is not primarily a product goal - more rehabs or a comprehensive plan - but a social process whereby people come to identify with and sense they are part of a distinct and unique place that is also close to them not as distant as downtown or city hall. I will focus more on this when I discuss my conception of mini-city halls.
The point here is that either of these conceptions are possible. In fact while the first is the dominant mode in Portland, in the minds of my informants and from my own observation, the latter is a part of the view of many activists - especially in the neighborhoods. It may not be a reality yet, but it is a goal some are pointing toward. As yet both conceptions exist in harmony because their advocates have agreed to an implicit 'conspiracy of silence' about where each might lead. In the present process, however, contradictions between both will emerge. Corbett-Terwilliger is proof of that, but the positive side of that is to be seen in Northwest Portland - which despite its admitted uniqueness is a possible model for all.

The question for this administration then is - which model of CP does it identify with and why? My impression is primarily with the first conception, but the rhetoric of this administration seemingly could be interpreted to go far beyond that limited idea of CP. And it is interpreted by some, to go beyond it or be 'pushable' beyond it. Perhaps this is the unintended, but real consequence of opening the Pandora's box of CP.

At this point, I should make it clear that in my own perspective I feel that if the preceding is correct, the CP process is succeeding in Portland in terms of the administrative conception of CP, but it also builds into itself inherently its own logical contradiction - the community power notion of CP, the process notion - which may be the final legacy of this administration's efforts of working in the vineyards of CP, intended or not. A dialectic has been set into motion.

A question: is this what this administration intended in the first place? Frankly, I hope so, since my own biases go in the direction of community power over the cooptation model - but in talking to people within the administration I am not convinced that this is the perception nor commitment. If a more limited conception of CP is intended, it has succeeded in being implemented - so well that if this administration or others following it who attempt to reverse the trend would be in serious political trouble. CP is too much an accepted part of the political vision of those involved in decision-making, at all levels, for it to be dismantled. To do so, would be to unleash a serious political backlash. Beyond that, it would be to renig on a promise, however differently interpreted, that has been made and kept, regardless of the reasons. But beyond this there is an ethical issue - promises are made to be kept - such is the bias of a consensual (contractual) society such as ours. One risks political and moral credibility to go back
on such a promise. Beyond that, on hard grounds of realism - the system with all of its warts works - not the most cynical would say or admit otherwise - at least nobody who talked to me did.

Therefore, the question is not so much what CP is, it is whatever people want it to be, or to make of it, and it seems to work in spite of what they make of it whether the orientation is product and/or process criteria. The question to me is that of the legacy to be left by this administration not four years from now - but say - 20 years from now. Is CP going to evolve into an integrated series of neighborhood units held together by a common view articulated through a comprehensive plan and a process of which the city council is the final but not absolute arbiter? Or is CP going to devolve into a series of discrete local entities - neighborhood government - risking the possible fragmentation (balkanization) in such a process but bringing with it a social and political renewal of the neighborhoods in addition to their economic revival? Is there a synthesis of the two possible? My analysis of options to be given thought will get to this issue.

Let me say at this point however that one central issue of a synthesis must be how to balance the interests, economic primarily, of the downtown against that parallel interest of the neighborhoods. Thus far the neighborhoods, with the exception of St. John's have been treated as livingrooms of the downtown - feeders to central city. If self-sufficiency or even competitive sufficiency (comparative advantage) between the downtown and the neighborhoods is developed (and here St. Johns and perhaps John's Landing are precursors of things to come) - then a natural tension is going to emerge - development for whose economic and political survival assuming limited consumer wants and budgets. With the above mentioned exceptions - the feeder concept seems to have been implicitly endorsed (Arterial Streets underscores this). But at the same time, the political viability of neighborhood power - even in the administrative sense - will demand economic development. Witness NW and Old Town. The impact of these changes may not manifest themselves until years hence - but this administration will have set into motion a series of policies that may bring either such a contradiction or a manageable tension with diversity.

But again - what is it that is intended?

If CP is to involve the administrative form, then a development pattern along present incremental and pragmatic lines is justified. The pattern of seemingly going with the success stories, the viable local entities in process of competition with each other may succeed
for quite some time in avoiding the possible contradiction. This is especially so if neighborhoods tend to respond differently as today - some succeeding in CP more than others. A kind of centralization of effort then is justified - city hall becomes the manager of local units each in a different stage of self-sufficiency. In a sense neighborhoods can be placed on a continuum from totally inactive/dependent, to active/coopted, to totally self-sufficient. As long as variation exists, the administration through its various planning agencies has a function to perform from the center as coordinator, facilitator, planner, and administrator - with each administrative move adjusted to the peculiar needs of each local unit.

However, with variation in approach by the center comes inefficiencies of scale and attention span - centralization of effort when talking of setting an arena for CP is by definition inefficient and contradictory. It is also costly in that efforts tend to be sporadic and incremental, rather than long-term and programmed - the result of the need to put out 'fires' that arise and then disappear. Manpower is used inefficiently. But looked at in the present context this may be the only way. More about the present context and how to alter it later.

If CP is to be a community empowering process then different issues arise. The long-term commitment to such must be spelled out clearly. Avenues for public participation must be enlarged. This includes manipulating the work-day so more citizens can participate. Government's own workday must be altered to fit into the citizen's schedule not the opposite. Technical help must be long-term, not temporary. Being a CP activist itself ought to perhaps be viewed as a fulltime job - at present only administrative personnel in the neighborhoods, CETA workers, and volunteers occupy this status. This needs to be enlarged. Question, how and who pays for it? My own answer later. Can land ownership be separated from the question of residency? How do we keep devolution from resulting in gilded middle-class ghettos - for the clearly or moderately privileged? NW comes close to this now. Another related issue - how do we keep the proper mix of life styles, ethnic, and income levels to make for diversity not homogeneity? Or can we risk the polarization such homogenization would bring? Can educational bodies, especially colleges, be enlisted to help educate a new core of CP activists?
V. OPTIONS: THE CONTEXT - A DEMOCRATIC ETHOS

Given the preceding analysis, it is clear that to abolish the present CP system, an uneasy but working alliance of the cooptation and self-sufficiency mode of CP, is impractical, impossible, and politically inconsistent with this administration's already stated goals, i.e. neighborhood revitalization and stabilization, maintenance of a socio-economic mix within Portland, continuing the growth of the inner-city population - especially the influx of families and home-owners, and the revitalization of the downtown core area as an economic and cultural center. Hence I will not treat the retrenchment option, but go to several others that are feasible and/or intriguing! In the process new problems in how to reinvigorate CP will arise both from the political/administrative level and from the theoretical level.

Keep in mind again, that my own bias is that CP ought to be more than a question of the delivery of services in a more efficient and acceptable manner and/or package. It fundamentally speaks to the issue of citizen mobilization (the raising of the public consciousness, conscience, and action among citizens). This all may take citizens far beyond their present conceptions or the goals of those in power. But that is the risk and promise of living in a democratic society - it is always in a process of evolving. Those elected and/or appointed to office may feel they know the public interest the best, and sometimes they do, sometimes, but the point is that they do not have the political right to act on that premise! Officials earn the right to be consented to in their actions, they cannot demand it or merely expect it - that is where the citizen is expert - only he knows where and whether the 'shoe is pinching'.

Hopefully, CP will result in both good programmatic results and in great citizen input. But programmatic results that are 'good' without citizen input or with citizen input that has been manipulated to result in a preconceived policy position wanted by those in political/administrative power are inconsistent with either the republican or the participatory conception of democracy. I emphasize this because we often forget that a democracy is both a process and a promise of humane government -but government by the few, be they expert or elite, no matter how benign is inherently incompatible with any form of CP.

The cure to the concern that citizens will make the wrong decisions based upon biased information (prejudice) and/or misinformation (ignorance) is not less CP - but more, plus a good
measure of patience and tolerance coming from elected officials and administrators. In Portland this forebearance seems the rule, this balance — but there always is an exception. Also, officials and administrators must become 'educators' more than they like to do and without a view simply to the next election or a future career in public administration. Public service ought not be the preserve of those seeking 'security'.

Now to the options, their problems and their potential.

VI. CP AND PLANNING — IS IT 'COST/EFFECTIVE'?

As is obvious, my outline in Memo #2, May 3, 1976, was found to be obsolete, to be asking the wrong questions, and to be asking questions that by their circularity beg the issue — power for whom and for what?

It is impossible to analyze the planning goals of the staff in city hall, whether one is considering the mayor's immediate staff, the PDC, OPD, or Bureau of Planning and how those goals relate to citizen goals in the neighborhoods — since the goals that have been stated are too general and the selectivity of vision of all involved create the self-fulfilling prophesy of 'success' — nobody I talked to even hinted at failure — frustration yes, but not failure. It seems all have developed real and/or psychic defenses against failure. Or as I suspect, in some respect CP succeeds to some degree in anybody's terms — especially when some view it in the short run (program goals) and can point to examples of success, and others look at it as a long term commitment (process goals) — hence for them empirical results beyond being involved in 'the action' are not primary considerations — though all would like program and process to merge.

Therefore, the intent of the memo missed the point as I was to discover. My preconceptions were altered. At least in terms of what I expected to find having read the literature on the subject — my expectations were not verified by what I saw and heard. As indicated throughout this report I find that a generally positive result.

To use a cost-accounting referent to assess CP misses the point. As a decision-making process CP is too complex and as a mechanism for socio-political interaction in the context of problem solving CP is qualitative not quantitative. CP's complexity and qualitative dimensions then makes a cost/effective analysis impossible — after all how does one measure the worth of that human interaction we call politics, especially democratic politics? One
to make such empirical presumptions must assume a false objectivity or simplify the political process unreasonably. The result is to ask the wrong questions, easier questions yes, but not the important ones that this study has attempted to raise.

Citizens, planners, and political officials see the process as efficacious not because they share a common framework, but precisely because they do not. And we have not reached the point where the substance, the results of CP in program, are visible enough to create possible future conflicts and/or contradictions. Hence all see the investment of time and money into CP as being efficacious (that all those who are involved - admittedly a small group out of the total population). They see CP as being in their interests albeit for different reasons. Even in Corbett-Terwilliger where cynicism is most obvious - most if not all informants, as with Inner SE et al., felt CP was more positive than negative as an experience. The question was how to improve the process in order that the product - be it homes rehabed, or trees planted etc. - would be achieved.

The major concern about CP was the degree to which each neighborhood felt city hall was on its side, whether it was the council, the mayor, or the various agencies involved. All expressed that in some sense they felt that a carrot was being dangled before them in the form of HCD or planning monies. As a result they felt in competition with other neighborhoods and given the scarce financial resources and/or time in which to use up an allotted budget - each feels under 'the gun'. Some conclude that they are involved in a 'shill' game where the carrot is being dangled to keep them in line (passive) or for votes (for their benefactors). Others accept the competition as part of the price and just try to compete that much harder - they accept the implicit challenge and quid pro quo. Others question the sincerity of the administration's commitment to CP or criticize it for not being clearer (i.e., telling administrator's under the council's and/or mayor's direction that the commitment to CP is real not rhetorical - hence quit your bureaucratic shuffling). Here again is an area of fuzziness that can only be clarified by the mayor and the council. It is obviously an educative role, not simply narrowly political (i.e. partisan = for votes).

In the mayor's case, my perception of citizens and my own reaction to watching him interact with the council - the fact he performs this educative role/function is very important. He seems to be committed to CP and to articulate CP's benefits
to the council and public in a way that no one else on the council can and/or does. This was especially apparent during the informal meeting on Arterial Streets early in May. More on this later.

As stated above, the options which will discussed presume a continued commitment to CP. The question which type is consistent with current policy; which one represents the best of all possible worlds; and which is realistic - becomes the type of question that needs asking. Obviously, no single option will satisfy all these criteria.

Therefore, assuming CP is both necessary and a 'proven' good -what must be done to complete its implementation? What more can be done? Or how can things be done better - more clearly and more effectively?

VII. THE ROLE OF THE MAYOR:

A. The Mayor's Conception and Goals Re: CP within Portland

1. Lack of clarification about the administration's purpose in encouraging CP: process and/or product orientation?
   a. As stated previously the mayor is both uniquely gifted and situated to articulate his commitment to CP and to defend it before the council - which seems necessary since it is generally perceived that he alone (except for Commissioner Ivancie) has an understanding of CP and commitment to it. Further, Ivancie’s commitment is perceived as grudging at best and more in the tradition of the old ward system of politics.
   b. In spite of the above, CP is strong enough to withstand a new administration, even one hostile to it - but it would be a far different 'ball game' than now - more of a holding action.
   c. There is a general perception that Mayor Goldschmidt's commitment to CP while being genuine is unclear as to its premises; the result is the perception that he is asking community people to 'trust me' when conflicts arise that suggest to some a backsliding on the CP commitment; this confusion may arise from the complex political as well as administrative definitions given to CP - is CP a plumb to
to be used as a reward in electoral politics?; or is it connected to a long range vision of where Portland ought to be years from now?; or is it a necessary evil imposed by the federal government? Each view has its proponents in the neighborhoods. The problem it creates is not who is right about interpreting city hall correctly so much as that regardless of that, the view of city hall's commitment is blurred.

d. Is the goal political mobilization for electoral success? Here HCD or planning assistance is viewed as a carrot to be dangled for votes or for support of administration initiatives.

e. An adjunct to "d" is that the carrot and stick approach hides the reality that no enough monies are available to really meet public expectations; or is it a device to use in exploiting success stories for political advantage?

f. Does neighborhood development and stabilization imply any social, economic or racial biases - the economics and politics of stabilization may suggest a disincentive to lower income groups and/or racial minorities.

g. How does comprehensive planning mesh with neighborhood power when one inherently involves a centralized process and the other a decentralized process. Here again, the mayor's role as an educator is vital in demonstrating that the goals are not antithetical - especially when planning staff that has now been in the neighborhoods is being shifted over to the comprehensive plan.

h. How can a creative mix of neighborhoods be coalesced in order to reduce destructive competition, paranoia about one being played off the other, and reduce the likelihood of neighborhoods turning into urban enclaves to exclude the young, the minority, the poor, or the renter?

i. Does CP really imply decentralizing power or simply a more efficient way of administering programs in behalf of citizen's assumed best interests?
Any clarification by the mayor and/or council here would rectify the sense of ambiguity that seems to stymie citizen input. Clarity here is as much a question of morale re: citizens being willing to trust city hall as it is in terms of being willing to invest time in CP. If accomplished one result might be not only less conflict between city hall and the neighborhoods, but also a redirection by those in the neighborhoods away from confrontation and/or negotiation politics vis-a-vis themselves and city hall and a redirection of that energy into more concentration on planning and recruiting more citizen participants.

But the above involve internal matters, i.e. within the context of the city and the mayor’s role within it. They raise questions of the allocation of technical expertise to make CP more effective and the conception of CP - to make it clearer to the public and those within the administration who have to carry out administrative guidelines.

Another area for mayoral attention exists outside his immediate constituency whereby he might affect national policy or at least articulate urban needs.

B. The Mayor’s Role Outside Portland as a Change Agent

1. External issues and political capital
   a. Since Mayor Goldschmidt occupies a place of national visibility on the National Conference of Mayor’s; since the national press has noted his regional and national leadership on urban affairs; and since Oregon especially through Rep. Ullman has influence on national fiscal policy, the mayor might use such opportunities to 1) explain the unique programs that he has stimulated in the CP area; and 2) to articulate the needs that such programs have in terms of financial support from the federal government.
   b. Senator Hatfield has also offered legislation relative to community development corporations that is directly relevant to neighborhood development - a bi-partisan and Oregon 'story' effort in this area might be explored.
   c. National policy often suffers from misdirected efforts within the bureaucracy of HUD and HEW; poorly conceived legislation by Congress full
of contradictions; and/or legislation not implemented by executive choice and/or because Congress authorized it without providing funding appropriate to it.

d. With the real possibility of a Democratic president this role offers potential - especially if Carter is to keep his implied and stated pledges to the Conference of Mayors; Carter's preference for sending monies directly to the cities is also an important benefit to be exploited by the urban constituency.

e. Not all community development problems in their economic funding can be solved locally since the tax base has shifted largely to the state/federal levels - hence more leadership and political leverage by city mayors is vital.

f. With four more years within which to work on this role, such an expenditure of the mayor's political capital might pay-off to the cities and his own political benefit. The future of the city and a political career can be logically linked in this instance.

g. The product resulting from HCD monies is open to serious criticism on two grounds - it is biased toward the middle-class (both a racial and class bias which in the implementation stage virtually assures a quota system which favors white middle-income people, and dis-favors lower income and minority people); and HCD has not proved it can meet the serious housing needs of either the middle or the lower income person; The cumbersomeness of the rules guiding HCD money is a conservative influence on such a program succeeding - hence built into it is almost assured citizen frustration; when an area is going through a period of socio-economic transition, like C-T, this bureaucratic and legislated conservatism adds to the extant local problems - it is a prescription for failure. It is almost as those who created the legislation wanted it to fail in the delivery of its promise.
h. As one not enthralled with the private sector's record in providing housing over the last 30 years for all classes of Americans; or with the federal government's often poorly conceived and locally politically administered PHA or FHA programs; but committed to the idea that governmental direction is needed - this substantive area of housing, public and private, needs the major attention of mayors with national leverage.

i. Is HUD policy whether in HUD and/or PHA really adequate to the task - whether in Portland or elsewhere? If not - then the promises of programmatic impact behind CP may be difficult to keep and the call for product results by agencies at the local level may be an open invitation for public disappointment later on... unless national policy in changed. We saw what the band-aid approach to urban problems brought us in the '60's under two Democratic presidents - are we to repeat the same mistaken policies?

VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE VIABILITY OF CP:

A. Overlapping Bureaucratic Jurisdictions in the Planning and Decision-making Processes - a Case of Bureaucratic "imobilism"

1. There is a lack of clarity about the roles and relationships of ONA, PDC, OPD, HAP, EP, and CPC.

2. Such a lack of clarity results in duplication of function and overlapping jurisdictions.

3. Here is a case where the bureaucracy by being complex and redundant confuses the citizens (and itself?) who participate - inefficiency is one result, alienation is another, and citizens end up playing one agency off against another until they get what they want; the cost in agency and CP morale is of questionable value in addition to time lost and programs delayed.

4. With the above is bred competition between bureaus that can be positive - they check each other's efforts to do a 'better' job; but negatively the check-mate that results may do more damage than the competition and confusion does in keeping each agency 'honest'.

5. Another fallout from this is that neighborhood and bureau conflicts which are the result of this confusion and/or duplication of effort become policy issues which can then only be settled by the Mayor and/or city council - when such might have been handled at a lower level.

6. Again, competition also is encouraged between neighborhoods that may be destructive not constructive - especially if it breeds the sense that some neighborhoods are 'favored'.

7. All of this raises a cost/effectiveness issue within the bureaucracy that is supposed to service CP needs.

8. This also leads to lost time in the neighborhood's getting 'their act together' for program approval.

9. This immobilism reinforces whatever tendencies exist at the agency level or within the community for retarding program development and implementation.

10. Better and closer coordination by the mayor and council over the bureaus might reduce the above problems.

11. Clarification of the administration's goals within the agencies involved in CP would itself reduce the overlapping and potential for wasteful competition.

12. Such clarification might result also in conflicts between agencies being resolved prior to necessary mayoral and/or council action.

13. Once coordination between bureaus involved in CP is achieved, less confusion to citizens will be transmitted and the fragmentation of policy and politicalization of the community reduce (negative bargaining).

B. The Jamming of Information Flow to Citizens

1. With the proliferation of programs, bureaus, and citizen commissions in addition to neighborhood groups it is confusing to the average citizen just whom to go to with a problem/question.

2. Such information overload can lead to frustration by citizens which might help explain the tendency for neighborhood 'activists' to be unrepresentative in socio-economic terms of their community's - there is a definite middle-class bias to CP in terms of who is active; also the young predominate over the elderly, home-owners over renters, this was especially obvious in C-T.
3. The mere fact that bureaus have had to negotiate over what form and quantity of community flier should be produced for CP groups indicates the seriousness of this concern. Information and resources for publication to CP groups ought to be centrally available whether in city hall or the neighborhoods.

C. The Continuity of Technical Staff within Neighborhoods
   1. If CP is to succeed in both informing citizens about their options and to deliver the product of better neighborhoods etc., then staff continuity in the local areas is a prerequisite.
   2. Recent cutbacks in planning staff and reorganization of BP probably has hurt bureau staff morale and also taken staff out of neighborhoods where they have come to be trusted and used efficiently by citizens.
   3. Staff within neighborhoods need to be assigned for the duration of a project or perhaps to the area itself permanently to develop continuity of service, citizen expertise, and the sense that they in the eye's of the neighborhood are their resource, not simply city hall's.
   4. The problem of continuity of staff is probably the most important problem I have isolated in terms of the delivery of services to the neighborhood and the development of expertise by lay citizens. Without it projects are disrupted, time lost, morale lowered, and citizen support jeopardized.

D. Bureaucratic Paternalism toward CP
   1. Some members of the planning agencies are perceived by citizens as being unsympathetic to real CP (especially CP which involves power to make decisions and not merely simply a right to be heard).
   2. A part of this results from the citizen's experience which suggests city hall planners have preconceived ideas about what is best for the local area and that what they are doing is seeking input that will ratify already developed plans.
   3. Some administrators by emphasizing 'product' over process give the impression that they are insincere when dealing with citizens - that all they want to do is to coopt them for their own grand plans.
4. On the other hand, citizens by emphasizing process over product leave themselves with an escape clause to which they may retreat when their own programs they have helped develop with city planners are not successfully implemented; both planners and citizens ought to be held accountable. This citizen focus upon process then is a reaction and/or defense mechanism by which paternalistic bureaucrats are dealt with - it keeps the 'pot boiling'. This involves the law of anticipated (negative) reaction - citizen to bureaucrat, vis-a-versa.

5. All the above imply the need for bureaucratic accountability which is the mayor's and council's duty and citizen responsibility which can only be developed if they are fully informed and politically-economically accountable. By the granting of real power, not simply the carrot and stick approach this responsibility will be developed. This is the opposite of the attitude of agencies that 'if you get your act together, then we will grant you that money...assuming it hasn't been spent already by another neighborhood.'

IX. OPTIONAL MODELS OF CP

A. Maintain the status quo - the present situation in spite of the above critique - perhaps due to the very problems cited - has witnessed a genuine commitment to CP by this administration and a solid response by the citizenry. While the relationship is full of conflict, tension, and a program more successful on the process side than the product side, there is strong sentiment behind continuing the CP effort at the present level. My own sense is that the majority of my informants would agree with this statement (see Appendix 'A'). However, I do not share their conclusions as my critique implies. Other models deserve thought anyway if only for self-examination. But it is important to know that the present effort gets high marks by virtually all involved, at whatever level in the community.
B. To reorganize the various commissions and bureaus involved in CP and planning. A very strong case can be made for this option. It would remove recalcitrant administrators (who seem to be few), it would eliminate bureau (inter-intra) conflict; and it would clarify for citizens just exactly to whom one can go to in city hall or in the neighborhood for expertise. It would also eliminate the zig-zag strategy of citizens playing off one administrator against another (next to the low turnout and high turnover in citizen participants and their need to develop expertise, which citizens tend to be overly optimistic about doing - this is the most inefficient part of the current process). However, to do such a reorganization probably is not feasible for two reasons: you are dealing with bureaucracies and programs over which the city has only partial control (hence the emphasis upon the mayor's role of educational leader and external change agent); and specific field reps within different agencies (ONA and PDC e.g.) have developed the sense of their community's and a trust within those communities - all of which would be jeopardized in a consolidation of CP-planning agencies. ONA works well in some areas of the city, Model cities in others, and PDC in others. Some areas like C-T will not respond to any program until their own internal political problems are solved by their own actions, or by the erosion of one faction from the community by process of default and/or economic circumstances.

C. CP as community power: Mini City Halls - There is a need to be clearer about why CP is valuable and/or needed. One perspective is that citizens must participate since it is their interests that are affected by governmental action and that their participation brings out all factions to react to policy - hence allowing political leaders to negotiate between or with various factions or to let the factions negotiate among themselves prior to final decision-making and policy implementation, by city hall. This has two important results - the process is open and final accountability is shared by all - not simply by politicians and/or administrators. I call this sophisticated citizen cooption.
The other mode involves a radically decentralized mode of CP when the process is such that citizens at the neighborhood level are granted by charter or other legal means the power that now resides solely within the city council to make all decisions regarding their community, unless otherwise delegated. This is the community power concept or what some call the mobilization model. One feature of the mobilization model is flexibility. You can jump right into devolving power immediately, or slowly doing it by increments—testing and experimenting with neighborhoods by contracting out services that they will render until they have the full-compliment of normal city responsibilities. Also, this decentralization process need not be antithetical to the centralization of 'some' services such as land-use-planning or water control which have efficiencies of scale larger than the local unit. What the model emphasizes is that those tasks most suited to local control be carried out by the neighborhood units, leaving others to larger entities, be they the city, the county, a metro-district, or the state. Financing could also be centralized through tax collections, yet decentralized through dispersal of tax monies to local neighborhoods—much as is done in revenue sharing or the old catagorical grant programs. The point here is that the present system represents something of this already. Finally, CP at this level could also be worked with central or city control, say on land use by mandating that when a local unit's decisions are not in conformity with the city and/or regional plan—the parties to the dispute can come to the city council on appeal. Or appeal could be made on questions of the asserted violation of procedural grounds, at the neighborhood level. Here the day-to-day job of the present city council would be taken over by a local neighborhood council—relieving the council to do long range planning and coordination with state and local units plus serving the above oversight function of an administrative appeals body. But power would devolve in the first instance to the local neighborhood units, not be shared in some mix as in the present system.
D. S.O.M. plus Mini City Halls: Skidmore, Owens, and Merrill have developed a method of gaining citizen participation which focuses upon informing citizens of the options available to them and the consequences of each possible policy choice. This is done in the context of a type of plebiscite process of citizen participation. Data and issues are articulated in a clearly written summary of the policy options and consequences, which is mailed to all residents or selected residents; an oral presentation is made in a public hearing of the options; revisions are then made in response to public comments in the hearing and alternative consequences are then refined for remaining policy options; and then with citizen responses taken by another public hearing plus having a second polling of citizens in the affected area - the final decision-making body is presented with this evidence of citizen preferences for its consideration prior to its own vote on the issue. This mode of gathering and presenting information to citizens would work well either in the context of the present system, or in its modified form under the mini-city hall concept (see above) - whether of the cooputive and/or radical form. Its major advantage is that it involves several levels of citizen involvement, it informs citizens by using technical experts in an appropriate way to support CP, it is organized and coherent, and yet it leaves the final decision up to the elected council at whatever level while giving that body a detailed accounting of citizen feelings. By using this approach at the lowest most decentralized level, citizen participation would be at its peak, its most effective, and most efficient level. S.O.M. has also found that after this process, which is not that expensive as it first seems, produced results not too far from the values of professional planners. The polarity between citizen and planner seems to be bridged by the clarity of information and the inclusion of citizens at all levels of the decision-making process.

E. Some Mixture of A - D: This is the most likely choice if the present process is to be changed in any form. But again, the reasons for making changes must always be clear to all involved whether in the administration of the city or within the neighborhoods. In this way the transition can be made with the least paranoia being encouraged. Politically this also keeps the Mayor's options open to bring about
change in a quieter way adjusting to his own situation and those of others with whom he must work. However, the weakness is that it is a patchwork that will be hard to articulate, to keep under control, and as a piecemeal process is open to the risks of unintended consequences, or consequences not anticipated.

F. The Commission Form of local government – as has been oft noted by political scientists and practitioners leads to inefficiencies precisely due to its lack of coordination, duplication, and competition among, by, and between commissioners. Perhaps the issue of executive and administrative lack of clarity is built into such a local system and such a system exacerbates the problems noted throughout this presentation. The lack of clarity noted may be stimulated by these characteristics of the commission form. However, these problems would probably exist in some form and/or degree no matter what the form of the central city administration – the literature on local government has shown this to be the case. However, charter reform away from the commission form to the executive-legislative form could not hurt and it would bring the efficiencies of greater mayoral accountability – a political efficiency. The coordination of administration policy throughout a unified bureaucracy under the direction of one man – the mayor – certainly could not harm clarity. But the basis of power would still be pluralistic at best or elitist at worst not decentralized and not necessarily conducive to CP – that depends upon the mix of the mayor's style and the demand's of citizens. If such a executive-legislative form encouraged the growth of ward government by the election of commissioners from wards within the city the process of CP would also be radically changed since the ward system probably would not coincide with the present network of neighborhoods – hence wards would be in serious political competition with neighborhood units. Again, a new form of CP would develop more in keeping with old-line machine politics. Electing commissioners at large solves that problem, but then brings about a lessened chance for minority representation. So much for the options.
Table 4.1:

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<th>Types of Respondents</th>
<th>Reactions to CP:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Qualified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. ACCH (13)</td>
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<td>6 (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. ACN (4)</td>
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<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. NA (10)</td>
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<td>1 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. MPAC (2)</td>
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<td>1 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Others (7)</td>
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<td>TOTAL = 36 (100%)</td>
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Table 4.2:

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<th>Types of Respondents</th>
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<tr>
<td>e (7)</td>
<td>6 (86%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL = 36 (100%)</td>
<td>27 (75%)</td>
<td>9 (25%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tentative conclusions:

Regardless of types of respondents and/or their distance from the neighborhoods there is literally no support for a retrenchment from present policy on CP. In fact, there is strong support for increasing the commitment and decentralizing the effort. Even among the most skeptical, the edge goes to a positive view of CP's potential.

If one assumes as the author does, that his respondents are not only an active but informed group on the subject, these findings are quite instructive. They are not merely a poll, but a poll of the 'informed' and expert in CP.

Distance away from the neighborhoods either confers the suspicion of CP's 'qualified' likelihood of success based upon 1) the political desire to have centralized power not be seriously challenged; and/or 2) a feeling generated through experience with CP and professional norms of administrative expertise that CP has inherent limits.

Closeness to CP, on the other hand, brings with it either 1) an over-estimation of what can be accomplished - an arrogance of local power-holders who are reinforced in this view by their own suspicion of the economic, political, and/or administrative motives of downtown interests; and/or 2) a faith-based upon experience-in citizen competency and the process of social interaction generated by CP. This is expressed by neighborhood activists who time and again claimed that they knew the pulse of their area far better than anyone in city hall. Hence with their proximity to the neighborhood plus their developing expertise in planning - these activists felt they were the 'real' experts.

The final category of people who are both professionals in areas related to the topic of CP and/or activists in CP - hence who have no immediate vested interests in Portland and have seen CP in other contexts - seem to tip the scales of judgment in the favor of those who wish to devolve power to the neighborhoods or at least increase the participatory aspects of local government. As a 'control' group they are easily compared to the other two blocs.

This impressionistic evidence suggests that it will be more productive to err in behalf of CP than to do the opposite.