Executive Summary

Introduction
At the request of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to develop a policy for active shooter incidents, the Portland Police Bureau (PPB) created Directive 730.00, Bureau Response to Active Violence Incidents. The Bureau, however, believed it was beneficial to include response to active events that encompass more than shootings, and, therefore, expanded the directive to include response to active violence incidents where the threat could also involve knives, vehicles, and/or explosive devices.

Public Comments
The Bureau posted this new directive for universal review and public comments starting in May 2019 and ending in July 2019, with both the first and second universal review periods receiving 30 days for comments. Comments received ranged from a variety of concerns regarding collaboration with other agencies and defining mutual aid; concern over the phrase “neutralizing the threat”; references to FEMA’s ICS structure and terminology; tactical response; and notification of PPB’s EDU and the role of detectives.

Collaborating with other agencies and defining mutual aid
Commenters noted that Portland Public Schools and Multnomah County have their own emergency management plans for reunification in an active shooter situation and suggested that PPB collaborate with these agencies and others to better understand their processes in the event cross coordination occurs. This feedback is well taken and the Training Division is aware of the need to cross train and collaborate with other agencies.

One commenter requested that PPB explain what mutual aid is in the directive, however, this is a common term among law enforcement and governmental agencies. PPB has mutual aid agreements in place with neighboring law enforcement agencies, county entities, and other first responder organizations that can quickly provide emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, materials and other associated services when requested. As an example, the Bureau has partnered with Portland Fire and Rescue to develop procedures that would expedite the medical response and extraction of injured individuals during an active violence situation.

“Neutralize the threat”
A commenter believed that the Bureau’s use of this term is offensive and suggested re-phrasing. The recommendation from the commenter was to replace this term with “disarm, capture, or if necessary, injure the individual(s) engaging in violence” but in these volatile and unpredictable situations, this restriction is problematic for members. The Bureau is committed to protecting human life to include using de-escalation techniques to prevent the use of deadly force, however, members must consider the safety of the community at large and act to minimize and/or reduce the loss of life.
Incident Command System (ICS) structure and terminology
A commenter pointed out that the ICS references and terms used in the directive should reflect those identified in the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National Incident Management System (NIMS) manual. The Bureau attempted to use ICS terminology where possible, but needed to use unique terms in places to properly capture the response to active violence incidents.

Tactical Response
One commenter expressed concern that the directive went into too much detail regarding tactical response. An active violence event can occur at any time and location and the Bureau believed it necessary to address situations that a member may encounter. The directive is meant to inform members on what actions to consider or perform based on the circumstances and information available. The Bureau also recognizes that active violence incidents occur spontaneously and quickly where a responding member may assume Incident Commander (IC) responsibilities well before they can establish a command post and coordinate or request resources. Nonetheless, PPB believes that members who assume the role of IC should become familiar with a list of essential responsibilities to help guide them through critical tasks from the initial response and, ultimately, through the overall process.

Notification of PPB’s Explosive Device Unit and the role of detectives
In the initial draft of this directive, the Bureau did not address responses to explosive devices. The Bureau has since incorporated information and added notification to PPB’s Explosive Device Unit by the IC in cases where there are confirmed or suspected reports of explosive devices at an incident site. Also, the Bureau included language on the role of detectives in the second universal review draft since active violence cases have criminal components which must be investigated.

We thank every individual who took the time to provide feedback on this directive. All comments received during both review periods are attached at the end of this document. We have removed all personal information to protect the privacy of commenters.

This directive will become effective on October 3, 2019.

Published: 9/3/19
730.00, Bureau Response to Active Violence Incidents

Refer:
- DIR 210.21, Leaves from Service
- DIR 220.40, Lawsuits and Claims
- DIR 240.00, Employee Assistance Program
- DIR 240.10, Line of Duty Death
- DIR 311.30, Off Duty Responsibility of Officers
- DIR 410.00, Injuries/Occupational Illness/Disability/LOS
- DIR 415.00, Return to Work Policy
- DIR 416.00, Critical Incident-Temporary Altered Duty
- DIR 600.00, Aircraft Use
- DIR 612.00, Radio Use
- DIR 630.05, Vehicle Intervention and Pursuits
- DIR 630.10, Driving Responses
- DIR 630.15, Foot Pursuits
- DIR 630.40, Medical Service Policy
- DIR 630.45, Emergency Medical Custody Transports
- DIR 630.70, Mobile Audio Video Procedures
- DIR 631.10, Dead Body Procedures
- DIR 631.30, Cooperation with Other Agencies
- DIR 631.35, Press/Media Relations
- DIR 640.45, Crisis Response Teams
- DIR 635.10, Crowd Management/Crowd Control
- DIR 640.02, Photography and Digital Imaging
- DIR 700.00, National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS)
- DIR 720.00, Special Emergency Reaction Team (SERT) and Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) Use
- DIR 740.00, Explosive Device Incidents and EDU
- DIR 900.00, General Reporting Guidelines
- DIR 905.00, Non-Force After Action Reporting
- DIR 1010.00, Use of Force
- DIR 1010.10, Deadly Force and In-Custody Death Reporting and Investigation Procedures

Definitions:
- Active Violence: An incident involving an armed person(s) who has the ability and intent to use or has used deadly force on other persons and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims. These incidents include circumstances under which the threat of deadly force may include but are not limited to a suspect’s use of knives, firearms, vehicles and/or explosive devices.
• Cold Zone: A geographic area where first responders can operate with minimal threat to personal safety or health.

• Contact Element: The officer(s) at the scene of an active violence incident tasked with locating the suspect(s) and stopping the threat.

• Hot Zone: A geographic area, consisting of the immediate incident location, with a direct and immediate threat to personal safety or health. All violent incidents are considered hot until law enforcement determines otherwise. Only law enforcement should operate in the hot zone.

• Incident Commander (IC): The individual responsible for on-scene incident activities, including developing incident objectives and ordering and releasing resources. The IC has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations and is responsible for the management of all operations at the incident site.

• Unified Command: A structure that brings together the Incident Commanders of major organizations involved in the incident in order to coordinate an effective response, while at the same time allowing each to carry out their own jurisdictional, legal, and functional responsibilities. In this structure, there is no one single IC; the incident is managed by jointly approved objectives identified by participating organizations.

• Warm Zone: The geographic area of operation that has been cleared of any immediate safety threats and has security measures in place. This is an area where a victim staging area may be established and life-saving medical care will be provided.

Policy:
1. The purpose of this directive is to provide protocols for assessing an active violence threat and immediately intervening to limit serious injury or loss of life during such incidents.

2. Active violence incidents pose an ongoing deadly threat to the safety of individuals present at the site of the incident and the community at large. Therefore, it is the policy of the Portland Police Bureau (PPB) to require immediate reasonable action by its members at the scene of active violence incidents, including the objectively reasonable use of force, to achieve three primary goals: neutralize the threat, prevent access to additional potential victims, and rescue injured victims.

Procedures:
1. The Bureau shall use the national, standardized, and exhaustive system established in the Incident Command System (ICS) to plan and manage significant incidents and events. Members shall refer to Directive 700.00, National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS), for specific guidance regarding incident management.

1.1. Depending on the scale of the active violence incident, the individual IC’s role in handling the command function of ICS may be expanded into a Unified Command (UC). Unified Command shall be established as soon as possible for incidents in which multiple jurisdictions and agencies are involved in a collective response effort.
2. Individual Member Intervention Prior to Bureau of Emergency Communications (BOEC) Notification.

2.1. In some instances, an individual member may be present in or near the active violence location (e.g., a mall or school). Whether on or off duty, in uniform or civilian clothes, the member may determine that immediate action is necessary and reasonable to stop the threat(s). However, the member must contemplate whether they are capable of effectively intervening based on their training and equipment.

2.2. When displaying firearms while in plainclothes, members shall, if feasible, verbally identify themselves as law enforcement officials, and conspicuously display their badges and/or other law enforcement identification to alert security personnel, arriving members, or civilians who may be armed.

2.3. When tactically feasible, members shall notify BOEC that an active violence situation exists. The member(s) should provide the following information and updates as available:

2.3.1. A description of the suspect;
2.3.2. General location of the suspect; and
2.3.3. An estimated number of victims.

3. Situational Assessment.

3.1. Based on available information, members already at the incident scene shall attempt to verify that an active violence situation exists through information provided by communications personnel; from persons confined within or exiting the target location; from witnesses; by reports of, or indicators of active violence; or through related means.

3.2. As time and resources permit, members on-scene shall ask witnesses or others for any detailed information about the incident so they form a tactical response to locate the suspect(s). Members on-scene shall communicate the information they gathered and broadcast their situation over the radio to inform responding members.

4. Contact Element(s) Response.

4.1. The objective of the contact element is to locate and neutralize the threat(s). Even if the threat seemingly has been terminated, contact element(s) are required to render the location safe, assist in screening and the orderly evacuation of persons to a designated area, and locating any other persons still in hiding.

4.2. Multiple contact elements may be needed to locate the assailant(s) and neutralize the threat(s) to the public.

4.3. When feasible, the contact element(s) shall attempt to provide a clear communications channel to supply the following types of information:

4.3.1. Actions with regard to the suspect(s) and
4.3.2. The location and number of victims and their medical needs.
4.4. The contact element(s) shall locate the suspect(s) in the most expeditious manner possible in order to stop the threat(s). In an active violence situation, the priority of members is to neutralize the threat(s), not to render medical aid to injured victims.

4.5. In the absence of clear indicators, members shall search the scene with the intent of locating the assailant(s) and/or injured persons.

4.6. Arriving tactical or other officers should be called upon to help clear the location of potential suspects, locate and evacuate persons in hiding, and render safe any dangerous munitions or armament.

4.7. After neutralizing the threat(s) and clearing the location, the contact element(s) shall immediately shift their objective to providing medical response.

5. Incident Commander Responsibilities.
5.1. The IC shall ensure that the following actions are accomplished:
   5.1.1. Ensure the Special Emergency Reaction Team (SERT) is activated in accordance with Directive 720.00, Special Emergency Reaction Team (SERT) and Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) Use;
   5.1.2. Ensure the Explosives Disposal Unit (EDU) is notified in accordance with Directive 740.00, Explosive Device Incidents and EDU, if there are confirmed or suspected reports of explosive devices present at the incident site.
   5.1.3. Establish a command post and assign a recorder to document actions;
   5.1.4. Organize and establish unified interagency communication(s) with other essential agencies responding to the incident scene such as Portland Fire and Rescue (PF&R), Emergency Medical Services (EMS), and other law enforcement agencies;
   5.1.5. Establish an inner perimeter to control access to and egress from the area of risk;
   5.1.6. Establish an outer perimeter;
   5.1.7. Establish staging areas in the cold zone for the following purposes and notify BOEC of their locations:
      5.1.7.1. For responding members and other emergency personnel (A staging area manager designated by the IC shall brief arriving personnel, maintain communication with the contact element(s), and assign duties as directed by the IC.);
      5.1.7.2. For treatment of the injured and evacuation by EMS or medevac;
      5.1.7.3. Where individuals without injuries should be directed for identification and debriefing (evacuation area);
      5.1.7.4. To accommodate arriving family members and/or friends of persons at the incident scene (Resource center); and
      5.1.7.5. For the media (This Joint Information Center should be staffed with appropriate personnel, such as public information officers.)
   5.1.8. Ensure that members assigned to the notification center maintain accountability of the individuals involved in the incident by documenting their identities until they can be reunited with family or others. Victims and witnesses suffering from emotional and/or physical trauma or shock should be kept under the observation
of medical personnel until such time as they may be safely transported to a hospital or home in the care of family or friends;

5.1.9. Summon chaplains and peer support officers to provide emotional support to victims and witnesses and information to family and friends of the victims;

5.1.10. Request mutual aid, if necessary;

5.1.11. Establish traffic control and management for the ingress and egress of public safety vehicles. Special consideration should be given to maintain open routes for rapid transport of the injured;

5.1.12. Contact appropriate aviation resources to control air space for possible medical evacuation resources and to establish restricted air space for law enforcement use only;

5.1.13. Request emergency medical assistance;

5.1.14. Coordinate with PF&R and EMS to deploy the Rescue Task Force (RTF) but only after the contact element(s) has made entry, provided a status report, notified the command post of the location of victims, established warm zones, and determined that rescue efforts may begin;

5.1.15. Initiate intelligence gathering on possible suspects;

5.1.16. Coordinate with owners or officials of the target location for floor plans; site layout; and a roster, including emergency contact information as available, of employees, students, residents, visitors, or others believed to be on-site;

5.1.17. Coordinate with investigative units to ensure the scene is properly preserved once the event enters the criminal investigation phase; and

5.1.18. Write an After Action in accordance with Directive 905.00, Non-Force After Action Reporting, or 1010.00, Use of Force, if force was used.

5.1.18.1. For incidents involving uses of deadly force, death as a result of member use of force or an in-custody death, members shall adhere to reporting and investigation requirements set forth in Directive 1010.10, Deadly Force and In-Custody Death Reporting and Investigation Procedures.


6.1. Depending on the nature and location of an active violence incident, the IC must determine whether to evacuate and transport uninjured victims and witnesses to another location. In circumstances where evacuation is necessary, the IC shall broadcast over the radio the need for a reunification site away from the incident area to reunite family and friends. The IC or their designee shall:

6.1.1. Identify a location in reasonable proximity to the incident area that has the capacity to receive the appropriate amount of individuals;

6.1.2. Identify a secondary location in the event the primary reunification site is overwhelmed;

6.1.3. Identify resources to adequately staff the reunification site(s);

6.1.4. Acquire or request transportation assets (e.g., Trimet buses, school buses, private charter buses) to transport individuals from the incident area to the reunification site(s);

6.1.5. Direct the evacuation and transportation of individuals from the incident area to the designated reunification site(s); and
6.1.6. Communicate with members positioned at the reunification site(s) on the status of evacuation and transportation of individuals from the incident area.

6.2. Members assigned to the reunification site(s) shall:
   6.2.1. Direct vehicles transporting evacuated individuals from the incident area to a secure assembly area out of view of the check-in location for family or friends.
   6.2.2. Establish a check-in location for individuals searching for family or friends involved in the active violence incident.
   6.2.3. Greet and inform family and friends checking-in of the reunification process and request that they provide basic information of the individuals they are searching for so that members can identify and reunite the proper individual(s).
   6.2.4. Reunify individuals from the secure assembly area with family or friends in a separate reunion area.

6.3. Detectives assigned to investigate the active violence incident shall attempt to locate, identify, and interview witnesses while being mindful and considerate of the situation.

7. Community Notification.
   7.1. The PIO or other designated individual(s) shall be responsible for ensuring appropriate information is distributed in a timely manner to the community. This may include:
      7.1.1. Shelter in place warnings for nearby locations during active shooter situations;
      7.1.2. Alerts to avoid the area due to heavy law enforcement activity and potential road closures; and
      7.1.3. Specific directions for individuals who elect to visit the scene.

   7.2. The PIO or other designated individual may communicate with the Bureau of Emergency Management to broadcast alerts through the community emergency notification system.

8. Debriefing.
   8.1. The Bureau shall schedule an informal debrief with all responding Bureau members to discuss the events as they unfolded in real time as soon as practical, after the incident. This debrief should address the initial notification and response of an active violence incident to actions taken to neutralize the threat and then the transition to search and rescue of injured persons.

   8.2. As soon as reasonably possible after the incident, the IC shall hold a formal debrief of the incident to discuss the overall plan, tactics, staffing and areas of improvement. The debrief should include key supervisory member participants in the incident, as well as command staff representatives from Training Division, Professional Standards Division and the Chief’s Office.

   8.3. The Bureau’s Employee Assistance Program (EAP) Coordinator shall schedule a Critical Incident Stress Debriefing for Bureau members involved in the incident as well as other personnel who were directly impacted (e.g., dispatchers, emergency medical
responders). Members shall refer to Directive 416.00, Critical Incident-Temporary Altered Duty, for additional information.

9.1. The Bureau shall provide initial and ongoing active violence training to all sworn personnel, including simulation exercises conducted in schools and other facilities and partnering first response agencies, where appropriate.

**History:**
- Originating Directive Date: 09/03/19
- Last Revision Signed: 09/03/19
  - Effective Date: 10/03/19
- Next Review Date: 10/03/20
Q1 Please provide feedback for this directive

Portland Public Schools has an emergency management plan through their Security Services Department, with four pre-designated reunification sites city-wide (MOUs are signed, traffic plans, etc are already drawn). PPS has the capacity (and would prefer) to manage this portion of the event (if it involves a PPS school site) for the IC in the event of a critical incident.

Q2 Contact Information (optional)

Name
Email Address
Phone Number
Q1 Please provide feedback for this directive

In the definition of Active Violence it states a suspect's use of explosive devices but the directive does not address notifying EDU. The use or threatened use of an IED during these events are on the rise nationally. The sooner EDU is on scene to assess the real threat these may pose the sooner action can be taken to address the real threat. Also, in Supervisor In-service, we addressed several cases where the perpetrator of these events have booby trapped their homes knowing that Law Enforcement would eventually end up there for their investigations.

Q2 Contact Information (optional)

Name
Email Address
Phone Number
Q1 Please provide feedback for this directive

For a whole host of reasons, this policy should not be enacted. It is a solution looking for a problem. Effective active violence response is achieved through solid training, not policy. There are already policies, such as DIR 1010.00, that lay out the limits of what is acceptable.

Gordon Graham talks about things "lying in wait" at an agency. There are things that are like buried mines, just waiting for the right circumstance to go off. I think this policy would be one of those. This policy does very little to tell members how to respond to an active violence incident, yet creates rigid rules against which that response must be judged. It also doesn't allow for changing response protocols over time.

It would be a bad idea to enact this policy. However, if it does end up being enacted, what follows are some thoughts on it as it is:

Hot Zone Definition: it is not accurate to say that only law enforcement should operate in the hot zone. PFB has a limited number of medics trained and equipped to operate in the hot zone, and I believe they would deploy to the hot zone during an active violence incident.

Warm Zone definition: "live-saving" should read "life saving"

Procedure Section 1: In light of the massive response an active violence incident will draw, this section should be significantly expanded to discuss assisting/cooperating agencies and their roles and liaison officers and their role, among other things.

Also, the statement regarding unified command is so vague as to be unhelpful. Something helpful would be similar to "When a PPB Incident Commander who is not actively engaged in the tactical response assumes command, that person should seek out the other agencies' Incident Commanders and form a Unified Command."

The entire second, third, and fourth sections dictate a tactical response. I see this as a huge problem. Over the 15 years I've been here, our active shooter training has moved from the five person pod to the Advanced Active Shooter Response training, to now discussing single officer response as a viable response. All of these changes have been successfully implemented--as soon as they were deemed appropriate--through training. There is no reason to think that active shooter response will not continue to evolve, both as shooters employ different tactics and as law enforcement learns from active shooter events. If this policy is implemented, we would have to go through a year or two directive review process to change our training to adopt a superior response tactic. This is not a reasonable burden to place on the public or members.

As an alternative, I'd suggest a single section with very vague statements about assessing the scene and responding in accordance with training.
Section 5 needs to be modified. Our current training—and I mean the module we deployed to supervisors’ inservice—calls for creating a IC long before it would be feasible to have a command post. The ASIM model allows for a responding officer to be the IC (if with limited responsibility).

Also, it is not PPB’s job to establish a medical staging area (also, this term doesn’t really have a meaning). Ambulance exchange points, casualty collection points, etc, are all the responsibility of PFB or AMR. The only responsibility PPB has is to provide security for these locations.

Likewise, the PPB IC doesn’t control the RTFs. They report to PFB. Instead of all the stipulations, RTFs should be deployed when the PFB IC deems it is safe for them to do so.

With respect to reunification, there should be something in there about deferring to the school if the event happens at a school. Most public schools have a solid reunification plan in place, and they are much better equipped to handle that task than we are.

Q2 Contact Information (optional)

Name

Email Address
#4

**Collector:** Web Link 1 (Web Link)
**Started:** Wednesday, May 15, 2019 12:49:12 PM
**Last Modified:** Wednesday, May 15, 2019 12:50:30 PM
**Time Spent:** 00:01:18

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**Q1** Please provide feedback for this directive

BOEC is never defined as Bureau of Emergency Communications. You might want to add that the first time you use the acronym in this directive.

**Q2** Contact Information (optional)

Respondent skipped this question
Q1 Please provide feedback for this directive

While victims and witnesses are mentioned throughout the directive, nowhere does it discuss, especially in Section 6 Reunification Process, that this is an incident that will likely be investigated by Detectives, and efforts should be made to locate, identify, and interview witnesses to the incident, and no persons should be released from the reunification site without a Detective Supervisor’s approval.

Q2 Contact Information (optional)  

Respondent skipped this question
730.00, Bureau Response to Active Violence Incidents
1st Universal Review: 5/3/19 – 6/2/19

Refer:
- DIR 210.21, Leaves from Service
- DIR 220.40, Lawsuits and Claims
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   5.1.2. Assign a recorder to document actions at the command post;
   5.1.3. Organize and establish unified interagency communication(s) with other essential agencies responding to the incident scene such as Portland Fire and Rescue (PF&R), Emergency Medical Services (EMS), and other law enforcement agencies;
   5.1.4. Establish an inner perimeter to control access to and egress from the area of risk;
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      5.1.6.1. For responding members and other emergency personnel (A member should be assigned to this staging area to brief arriving personnel, maintain communication with the contact officer(s) or team(s), and assign duties as directed by the IC);
      5.1.6.2. For treatment of the injured and evacuation by EMS or medevac;
      5.1.6.3. Where individuals without injuries should be directed for identification and debriefing (evacuation area);
      5.1.6.4. To accommodate arriving family members and/or friends of persons at the incident scene (notification center); and
      5.1.6.5. For the media (This area should be staffed with appropriate personnel, such as public information officers);
   5.1.7. Ensure that members assigned to the notification center maintain accountability of the individuals involved in the incident by documenting their identities until they can be reunited with family or others. Victims and witnesses suffering from emotional and/or physical trauma or shock should be kept under the observation of medical personnel until such time as they may be safely transported to a hospital or home in the care of family or friends;
   5.1.8. Summon chaplains and peer support officers to provide emotional support to victims and witnesses and information to family and friends of the victims;
   5.1.9. Request mutual aid, if necessary;
5.1.10. Establish traffic control and management for the ingress and egress of public safety vehicles. Special consideration should be given to maintain open routes for rapid transport of the injured;
5.1.11. Contact appropriate aviation resources to control air space for possible medical evacuation resources and to establish restricted air space for law enforcement use only;
5.1.12. Request emergency medical assistance;
5.1.13. Coordinate with PF&R and EMS to deploy the Rescue Task Force (RTF) but only after the contact officer(s) or team(s) has made entry, provided a status report, notified the command post of the location of victims, established warm zones, and determined that rescue efforts may begin;
5.1.15. Coordinate with owners or officials of the target location for floor plans; site layout; and a roster, including emergency contact information as available, of employees, students, residents, visitors, or others believed to be on-site; and
5.1.16. Write an After Action in accordance with Directive 905.00, Non-Force After Action Reporting, or 1010.00, Use of Force, if force was used.

5.1.16.1. For incidents involving uses of deadly force, death as a result of member use of force or an in-custody death, members shall adhere to reporting and investigation requirements set forth in Directive 1010.10, Deadly Force and In-Custody Death Reporting and Investigation Procedures.


6.1. Depending on the nature and location of an active violence incident, the IC must determine whether to evacuate and transport uninjured victims and witnesses to another location. In circumstances where evacuation is necessary, the IC shall broadcast over the radio the need for a reunification site away from the incident area to reunite family and friends. The IC or their designee shall:

6.1.1. Identify a location in reasonable proximity to the incident area that has the capacity to receive the appropriate amount of individuals;
6.1.2. Identify a secondary location in the event the primary reunification site is overwhelmed;
6.1.3. Identify resources to adequately staff the reunification site(s);
6.1.4. Acquire or request transportation assets (e.g., Trimet buses, school buses, private charter buses) to transport individuals from the incident area to the reunification site(s);
6.1.5. Direct the evacuation and transportation of individuals from the incident area to the designated reunification site(s); and
6.1.6. Communicate with members positioned at the reunification site(s) on the status of evacuation and transportation of individuals from the incident area.

6.2. Members assigned to the reunification site(s) shall:

6.2.1. Direct vehicles transporting evacuated individuals from the incident area to a secure assembly area out of view of the check-in location for family or friends.
6.2.2. Establish a check-in location for individuals searching for family or friends involved in the active violence incident.
6.2.3. Greet and inform family and friends checking-in of the reunification process and request that they provide basic information of the individuals they are searching for so that members can identify and reunite the proper individual(s).

6.2.4. Reunify individuals from the secure assembly area with family or friends in a separate reunion area.

7. Community Notification.
   7.1. The PIO or other designated individual(s) shall be responsible for ensuring appropriate information is distributed in a timely manner to the community. This may include:
       7.1.1. Shelter in place warnings for nearby locations during active shooter situations;
       7.1.2. Alerts to avoid the area due to heavy law enforcement activity and potential road closures; and
       7.1.3. Specific directions for individuals who elect to visit the scene.

8. Debriefing.
   8.1. The Bureau shall schedule an informal debrief with all responding Bureau members to discuss the events as they unfolded in real time as soon as practical, after the incident. This debrief should address the initial notification and response of an active violence incident to actions taken to neutralize the threat and then the transition to search and rescue of injured persons.

   8.2. As soon as reasonably possible after the incident, the IC shall hold a formal debrief of the incident to discuss the overall plan, tactics, staffing and areas of improvement. The debrief should include key supervisory member participants in the incident, as well as command staff representatives from Training Division, Professional Standards Division and the Chief’s Office.

   8.3. The Bureau’s Employee Assistance Program (EAP) Coordinator shall schedule a Critical Incident Stress Debriefing for Bureau members involved in the incident as well as other personnel who were directly impacted (e.g., dispatchers, emergency medical responders). Members shall refer to Directive 416.00, Critical Incident-Temporary Altered Duty, for additional information.

   9.1. The Bureau shall provide initial and ongoing active violence training to all sworn personnel, including simulation exercises conducted in schools and other facilities and partnering first response agencies, where appropriate.

Provide feedback here.
COMMENTS ON "ACTIVE VIOLENCE" AND ALARM RESPONSE DIRECTIVES, MAY 2019

To Chief Outlaw, Capt. Parman, Lieutenant Morgan, PPB Policy Analysts, Compliance Officer/Community Liaison Team, Portland Committee for Community Engaged Policing, US Dept. of Justice, Independent Police Review, Citizen Review Committee and the Portland Police Bureau:

Below are comments from Portland Copwatch (PCW) on the two new Directives posted in early May for comment (https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/73677). Both of these Directives involve actions on the part of the police which could be easily mis-used to foment unnecessary fear and control of the population (730.00 Response to "Active Violence Incidents") or inappropriate searches (630.35 Response to Alarm Calls for Service).

We are thankful that because these policies are brand new, the community has 30 days to provide feedback. Since that is possible under the Bureau's Directive review structure, we continue to ask that the first review be made at least 30 days for all policies.

In addition, we suggest that all sections-- including the "Refer" section which lists 29 other Directives in 730.00-- be given letters and numbers for easy reference.

The references below are to Procedure Sections unless otherwise noted.

DIRECTIVE 730.00 BUREAU RESPONSE TO ACTIVE VIOLENCE INCIDENTS

At first we thought this was a response to recent incidents of the Bureau showing up to the scene where Patriot Prayer members are engaged in fisticuffs, pepper-spray attacks and/or blunt object exchanges with Antifa, but officers have sat back and done nothing.* It turns out to be mostly about scenarios that are usually referred to as "active shooter" incidents. In fact, the definition of "Active Violence" requires that the suspect "has used deadly force on other persons" using "knives, firearms, vehicles and/or explosive devices."

As noted above, fully 29 other Directives are referenced, from Lawsuits and Claims (?!?) to Aircraft Use to Line of Duty Death / Dead Body Procedures and Crowd Control. This may be the longest such list in any PPB Directive, and also as noted above, PCW suggests numbering each one. This could allow for subsections summarizing why the Directives are being cross-referenced.

PCW objects to the use of the phrase "neutralize the threat" in Policy Section 2 and Procedure Sections 4.2, 4.4, 4.7 and 8.1. This is used regularly as a euphemism for "kill the shooter." Perhaps more descriptive language could be used, such as "disarm, capture or, if necessary, injure the individual(s) engaging in violence," with one key
word being "injure" to avoid encouraging the macho response of killing.

Section 2.2 wisely suggests that officers in plainclothes identify themselves and display their badges. This is a good warning as many plainclothes officers-- particularly officers of color-- have been shot by their colleagues when mistaken for criminals. (Notably, Bias Based Policing is one of the few Directives not referenced here.) That said, PCW found agreement with Sheriff Mike Reese, who wrote an op-ed opposing arming teachers-- though our reasoning is that adding more firearms into an already volatile situation will likely make things worse. Reese's argument is that the police will not be able to tell who is "the bad guy." Certainly in life-threatening situations with active gunfire things will not go perfectly, but perhaps one other item to add to the Directive is for officers to remain calm.

Section 5.1.9 should explain that "mutual aid" for officers means calling in other jurisdictions, not achieving a Utopian anarchist society where people provide for one another (in which case, there would likely be far less violence and, one hopes, no need for police).

Regarding our overall concern that officers may blow such situations out of proportion, while it is good to train students what to do in case of such an emergency, we hope the officers conducting "simulation exercises in schools" are not doing so while students are present (Section 9.1 on Training). There's a not-very-fine line between being prepared for the worst and making people nervous it is going to happen at any moment. In fact, this is part of why officers tend to use too much force, because they are over-trained to think every threat is deadly.

On a related note, we don't have all the details but it does seem that the incident that occurred at Parkrose School recently can be instructive for this Directive and the Bureau's training. If the people on site are convinced there is no longer an active threat, perhaps police can send in a smaller team to do a cursory search as described in the Alarm Response Directive rather than locking down two schools and keeping parents away from their children. And, we need to say, thankfully a minimum of force was used by the school's coach, nobody was seriously injured and nobody was shot.

CONCLUSION

Once again we thank the Bureau for making this process open to the public, though it would probably be a good idea to hold forums three or four times a year where the Bureau can explain face to face its reasons for including or not including certain suggestions from the community. Also, we continue to urge the Bureau to reconsider its timelines on Directives review to allow advisory bodies the chance to weigh in.

--Portland Copwatch

* Mind you, doing nothing can be better than unleashing more violence upon the participants, but at the same time, it continues to seem that the PPB cracks down more on people entering the street to protest injustice than people who engage in assaults.
Q1 Please provide feedback for this directive

Just STOP the violence. Let police do their job. Step in early. I would like to enjoy downtown Portland, again. I avoid it now.

Q2 Contact Information (optional)  
Respondent skipped this question
Q1 Please provide feedback for this directive

1 Need to address police barring people egress from ongoing violence.
2 need to lay out strict expectations of individual officers and punishments if they fail to meet them.

Q2 Contact Information (optional)  Respondent skipped this question
#3

| Collector: | Web Link 1 (Web Link) |
| Started: | Wednesday, July 03, 2019 8:09:57 PM |
| Last Modified: | Wednesday, July 03, 2019 8:11:34 PM |
| Time Spent: | 00:01:37 |
| IP Address: | 69.71.181.214 |

**Q1** Please provide feedback for this directive

As long as they don't have a "stand down" order when violence is eminent. Like all these friggin' "rallies" and such. They always get violent.

**Q2** Contact Information (optional)

Respondent skipped this question
Q1 Please provide feedback for this directive

As an agency that is required to be NIMS compliant, we need to insure our directives take that into account.

Definition of Incident Commander - Pg 4 NIMS defines the IC. Pg 24 further defines the IC’s role to develop the objectives, priorities and strategic guidance. By defining their role here as developing "strategies and tactics" muddies the water if the incident expands to include an Operations Section Chief (which an incident of this magnitude should), who by definition creates the strategies and tactics (Pg 28 NIMS). If the IC has not designated an Operations Section Chief, then the responsibility of developing strategies and tactics would fall back to the IC.

Definition of Unified Commander - It is important to emphasize in Unified Commander (UC) there is no one IC, the incident is managed by a jointly approved set of objectives in one Incident Action Plan (Pg 22 NIMS).

5. Incident Commander Responsibilities: “Consider span of control and the rapidly expanding scope of the incident to designate other members to the incident Command and General Staff positions (Operations, Logistics, Planning, Investigations, Finance, Public Information Officer, Liaison Officer, Intel)”

5.1.7 Establish Staging Areas: A Staging Area has a specific definition in NIMS (Pg 31, 70 NIMS). Four of the five areas listed below are not Staging Areas.

5.1.7.1 This member should be referred to as a Staging Area Manager (Pg. 31 NIMS)

5.1.7.4 To be more aligned with Multnomah County, referring to this as a Resource Center might be better fitting. They are going towards a model where a Disaster Resource Center (DRC) is stood up at an incident such as this and it would include this type of area along with reunification and behavior health resources.

5.1.7.5 This is a Joint Information Center (JIC) as we would be working with other entities to provide information to the public. (Pg 65 NIMS)

6. Reunification Process: As described here and at Supervisors In-Service, this can be a different process depending on the location. While PPS may be helpful with one of their schools it could be a very different process elsewhere. Multnomah County has taken the lead locally for reunification (outside of PPS schools) and this directive should be cross-walked with their work or at least mentioned to get supervisors thinking about that available resource.
Q2 Contact Information (optional)

Name
Email Address
Phone Number
Q1 Please provide feedback for this directive

COMMENTS ON PUBLIC SAFETY SPECIALISTS AND "ACTIVE VIOLENCE" DIRECTIVES, JULY 2019

To Chief Outlaw, Capt. Parman, Lieutenant Morgan, PPB Policy Analysts, Compliance Officer/Community Liaison Team, Portland Committee for Community Engaged Policing, US Dept. of Justice, Independent Police Review, Citizen Review Committee and the Portland Police Bureau:

Below are comments from Portland Copwatch (PCW) on the two Directives posted in early July for comment (https://www.portlandoregon.gov/police/73677). They were previously posted in June (630.26 Public Safety Support Specialists) and in May (730.00 Response to "Active Violence Incidents").

While these are "second reviews" for which the public has 30 days to comment, we continue to ask that all reviews be given at least 30 days to allow organizations including advisory groups time to make meaningful comments.

In addition, we continue to believe that all sections-- including the "Refer" and "Definitions" sections-- be given letters and numbers for easy reference, to avoid having confusion when referring to "Section 1," for example. The references below are to Procedure Sections unless otherwise noted.

DIRECTIVE 730.00 BUREAU RESPONSE TO ACTIVE VIOLENCE INCIDENTS

There are a similarly small number of changes being proposed to Directive 730.00 on "Active Violence Incidents," which we noted is about scenarios commonly referred to as "active shooters." A reference was added to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the acronym of the Bureau of Emergency Communications was spelled out (Section 2.1), and a term that was called "contact officers or team" was changed to "contact element" (definitions and Section 4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 5.1.7.1 and 5.1.14). A new Section (5.1.2) was added to notify the Explosives Disposal unit in cases involving "suspected explosive devices."

Other new sections were added asking the Incident Commander to preserve evidence (5.1.17), Detectives to interview witnesses "while being mindful and considerate of the situation" (6.3), and allowing the Public Information Officer to make emergency notifications (7.2).

Here are the items we suggested that the Bureau did not take action on:

--Enumerating all of the 29 (now 30) "Refer" items, most of them other Directives.

--Changing the offensive term "neutralize the threat," which is used regularly as a euphemism for "kill the shooter," in Policy Section 2 and Procedure Sections 4.2, 4.4, 4.7 and 8.1. We suggested language such as "disarm, capture or, if necessary, injure the individual(s) engaging in violence," though a threat could also be "neutralized" with de-escalation tactics.

--Explaining the term "mutual aid" in Section 5.1.9, which we speculated means calling in other jurisdictions.
--Restricting officers from conducting "simulation exercises in schools" so that it is not done while students are present (Section 9.1). We wrote: "There's a not-very-fine line between being prepared for the worst and making people nervous it is going to happen at any moment. In fact, this is part of why officers tend to use too much force, because they are over-trained to think every threat is deadly."

CONCLUSION

While we are thankful that the Bureau asks for public input, we do not feel as if the decision-makers are taking actions to adopt the valid concerns we are raising, with changes which would build trust and minimize the Bureau's perceived position as an occupying force. We continue to suggest there should be open forums three or four times a year where the Directives team can talk with the public directly so that the reasons given in published policies for not adopting such comments can be the subject of a dialogue, rather than a one-way final word from the Bureau.

--Portland Copwatch

Q2 Contact Information (optional)

Name

Email Address