

Large-scale Aviation Accident Response Workshop



Portland, Oregon
November 8, 2016



Summary Report



FEMA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Large-scale aviation accidents are rare, but they are high-consequence events that occur with little or no warning. Due to the exceptionally large number of flight paths that cross our country, accidents can occur almost anywhere within our national, or along international, borders. Communities surrounding airport boundaries should be prepared to mount coordinated, multi-jurisdictional response and recovery efforts necessary to address the effects of an in-flight destruction of a commercial aircraft and the resulting wide-area debris field containing wreckage, personal effects, and human remains.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) partnered with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and the Regional Disaster Preparedness Organization (RDPO), to explore response efforts to a large-scale aviation accident. On November 8, 2016, participants gathered at Camp Withycombe for informational presentations, followed by workshop discussions. The workshop scenario involved the aftermath of an in-flight breakup of a wide-body commercial airliner bound for Portland International Airport (PDX). Debris and secondary effects stretched for 3.66 miles.

The event was a unique opportunity to convene a wide range of response stakeholders to examine coordination, communication, and command challenges that this specific aviation scenario presents.

The event was a unique opportunity to convene a wide range of partners across various local, state and federal departments and agencies to examine coordination, communication, and command challenges that this specific scenario presents. The clear consensus of participants was that this type of accident will present a high-pressure, high-visibility event that requires significant attention, cooperation, and understanding to ensure a successful and collective unified response effort.

This event marks the ninth time that FEMA and NTSB have conducted a workshop in conjunction with the NTSB Transportation Disaster Assistance Division's outreach activities. Prior events were held in the National Capital Region (November 2014); Detroit, MI (May 2015); Sacramento, CA (August 2015); Newark, NJ (October 2015), Bangor, ME (January 2016); Atlanta, GA (February 2016); New Orleans, LA (June 2016), and Kansas City, MO (September 2016).

Key findings from this event include the following:

- *The complexity of the response to this type of event will require coordinated information sharing across jurisdictions and agencies.* Establishing and maintaining clear, unified messaging between the command structure and key stakeholders will be among the initial priorities.
- *The various response organizations must coordinate efforts to locate, deploy, and prioritize resources appropriately.* Situational awareness and ongoing communication will drive these efforts.
- *During the first few hours of the response, the scope and scale of the incident will be unclear.* Various governmental bodies will need to start connecting the dots as information continues to circulate.

- *Responders defined their key priorities as life preservation and perimeter security followed by evidence preservation.* Multiple people, organizations, and jurisdictions will be involved in evidence preservation and debris management. The debris field should be treated as a crime scene and evidence should be handled with great care.
- *Development of a regional response plan for on-scene command will contribute to the overall success of response efforts.* Existing regional response plans for information coordination and for multiagency coordination should be regularly updated, disseminated, and practiced. Additional regional response plans for other response capabilities should also be developed.
- *The ability to tag and track casualties and fatalities should be enhanced.* Capabilities exist only to track those patients that are loaded into and transported by ambulances, not those who self-transport or seek treatment at urgent-care centers.
- *The incident's size, scope, and resulting infrastructure damage will add complexity to the mass casualty incident response.* The high number of casualties, the multiple incident sites, and the possibility for blocked or damaged roadways will initially impede a quick and coordinated response.
- *Fatality management will be the responsibility of multiple organizations and will require coordination.* Due to the effects of a complete aircraft breakup on human remains and the large number of victims, fatality management will be difficult given local capacities and will require increased coordination between agencies.
- *All partner agencies should be able to access and use WebEOC to develop a common operating picture and maintain situational awareness.* Time and fiscal constraints continually impede efforts to train first responder personnel on WebEOC.
- *Notification of friends and family members of victims onboard the aircraft is an initial priority.* An initial family assistance center should be established by the airline in order to provide initiation information to victims' relatives.
- *Coordination of information is the key responsibility of the public information officers.* Public information officers from the various response agencies and the airline will coordinate to ensure a consistent message is issued by all entities via multiple media outlets.
- *The different public information missions at the Joint Information Center and the Family Assistance Center were not clearly understood by many participants.* Response personnel should be trained on public information considerations and on the basics of the Portland Metropolitan Region Emergency Public Information Concept of Operations Plan.
- *The presence of foreign nationals will add complexity to the response.* Appreciating language barriers and cultural sensitivities may prove to be challenging, but the appropriate resources must be available to all accident victims and their families.

WORKSHOP OVERVIEW

Workshop Name	Large-scale Aviation Accident Response Workshop
Workshop Date	November 8, 2016 (7:30 a.m.– 4:30 p.m. Pacific Standard Time)
Scope	This workshop was a scenario-driven, facilitated discussion involving local, state, and federal agencies and private sector and nongovernmental partners. The scenario served to drive discussions about coordination among various jurisdictions to deliver required capabilities to affected communities in the aftermath of an in-flight breakup of a large commercial aircraft.
Mission Area	Response
Core Capabilities	Fatality Management Services; On-Scene Security Protection, and Law Enforcement; Operational Communications; Operational Coordination; Planning; Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services; Public Information and Warning;
Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Support investigation of the accident (site assessment, access, and control; evidence collection and preservation; logistical support; sharing of information relevant to the accident investigation; victim accounting process; and mass casualty and mass fatality management).• Meet the needs of survivors and families of victims (accident notification; victim accounting; access to information and support services; and personal effects management).• Achieve consistent and unified public messaging (identifying appropriate spokespersons; coordinating release of information to the public; and assessing social media challenges).• Examine mechanisms to employ and coordinate whole community capabilities (local, state, federal, private, and nongovernmental) while achieving unity of effort.• Examine existing local, state, and federal capabilities; identify necessary response resources, potential shortfalls, and duplications of effort; and assess the need to develop or revise relevant plans.
Scenario	Taroko Airlines Flight 222 (TKA 222) breaks apart in flight while approaching Portland International Airport (PDX), scattering wreckage across a 3.66-mile debris field both in Milwaukie and Portland, Oregon. There are no survivors among the plane’s passengers or crew, and there are additional fatalities and casualties on the ground.

Participating
Organizations

Participants included 117 representatives from law enforcement, fire, hazardous materials, public health, public information, and mass care organizations from the affected counties, the State of Oregon, and cities across Oregon and Washington. Additional participants included representatives from various airlines including United and Spirit, and federal agencies with search, recovery, or support capabilities in the affected area. Appendix A provides a full participant list.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) supported the development and conduct of this workshop in coordination with Regional Disaster Preparedness Organization (RDPO), local jurisdictions, and interagency partners, particularly the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).

Goal

The goal of this Large-scale Aviation Accident Response Workshop was to examine the ability to coordinate and deliver required capabilities across multiple jurisdictions to affected communities in the aftermath of an in-flight breakup of a wide-body international commercial aircraft. This workshop served to increase awareness among participants regarding existing federal, state, and local protocols and procedures that would be implemented in response to a large-scale aviation accident.

Objectives

Workshop objectives were to:

1. Support investigation of the accident (site assessment, access, and control; evidence collection and preservation; logistical support; sharing of information relevant to the accident investigation; victim accounting process; and mass casualty and mass fatality management).
2. Meet the needs of survivors and families of victims (accident notification; victim accounting; access to information and support services; and personal effects management).
3. Achieve consistent and unified public messaging (identifying appropriate spokespersons; coordinating release of information to the public; and assessing social media challenges).
4. Examine mechanisms to employ and coordinate whole community capabilities (local, state, federal, private, and nongovernmental) while achieving unity of effort.
5. Examine existing local, state, and federal capabilities; identify necessary response resources, potential shortfalls, and duplications of effort; and assess the need to develop or revise relevant plans.

Core Capabilities

The *National Preparedness Goal* (hereafter referred to as “the Goal”), released in September 2011 and updated in September 2015, defines whole community preparedness for all types of disasters and emergencies.

The Goal is succinct: “A secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”

The Goal identifies five mission areas—prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery—in which it groups 32 core capabilities, which are the distinct critical elements needed

to achieve the Goal. This workshop examined core capabilities most relevant to the workshop objectives, as outlined in Table 1.

Table 1. Core Capabilities Associated with Workshop Objectives

Objective	Core Capability	Core Capability Description
1	On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement	Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.
	Public Health, Healthcare and Emergency Medical Services	Provide lifesaving medical treatment via emergency medical services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health and medical support and products to all people in need within the affected area.
	Operational Communication	Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.
1 and 2	Fatality Management Services	Provide fatality management services, including decedent remains recovery and victim identification, working with local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and Federal authorities to provide mortuary processes, temporary storage or permanent internment solutions, sharing information with mass care services for the purpose of reunifying family members and caregivers with missing persons/remains, and providing counseling to the bereaved.
3	Public Information and Warning	Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.
4	Operational Coordination	Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.
5	Planning	Conduct a systematic process engaging the whole community, as appropriate, in the development of executable strategic, operational, and/or community-based approaches to meet defined objectives.

Format

This event featured three distinct components: an outreach and training session, presentations by various airline representatives, and a facilitated, scenario-driven discussion. The event was customized to the needs and capabilities of select counties in the Portland Metropolitan Region. These counties were Clackamas, Columbia, Multnomah, and Washington Counties in the State of Oregon and Clark County in Washington State. The NTSB-led training session educated participants on NTSB authorities, investigative responsibilities, standard approaches for scene documentation, and family assistance operations for an aviation accident response. It also included a case study of the Colgan Air crash in 2009 to demonstrate these processes for an actual aviation accident. Federal Emergency Management Agency support staff facilitated discussions focused on four key areas in the afternoon breakout groups:

1. *Evolving response organization*, focused on overall incident organization;
2. *Debris management and evidence preservation*, focused on site identification and the collection and preservation of evidence;
3. *Patient tracking and fatality management*, focused on identification, treatment, and tracking of casualties and humane treatment of fatally injured victims; and
4. *Family assistance and public communications*, focused on support to injured and affected persons on the ground (including support to victims' families) and on public messaging.

Participants were assigned to one of the four breakout groups based on experience and organizational position. Breakout discussions on each topic were participant lead and driven, while supported by a facilitator and a recorder. The facilitator for each breakout group provided an out brief at the final plenary session, addressing initial priorities, key challenges, and potential solutions identified by their group for their assigned topic.

Scenario

Workshop discussions centered on a hypothetical in-flight breakup of a wide-body commercial airliner over Milwaukie, OR, approximately 10 miles southwest of its destination, PDX. The 285 passengers and crew on board represented seven different nationalities, including, Korean, Chinese, Spanish, British, Japanese, Canadian, and American passengers; there were no survivors. The accident scattered wreckage across a 3.66-mile debris field in Clackamas and Multnomah counties (see Figure 1), and there were additional fatalities and injuries on the ground. Debris and wreckage caused several incidents:

- The aircraft initially broke apart over the Willamette River and the tail section landed on the intersection of Oregon Roadways 224 and 99E. Twenty people were killed immediately at the impact site, while fifteen more suffered triage-level Red and Yellow injuries and another ten people suffered triage-level Green injuries.
- The roadways were completely blocked, which resulted in significant traffic jams in all directions and delayed emergency response. Bystanders from the stopped vehicles near the wreckage site captured photos and posted to social media. Several residential and commercial areas surrounding the impact site of the tail section were affected, particularly the McLoughlin Industrial neighborhood of Milwaukie.

- The main fuselage section landed near the intersection of SE 28th Avenue and SE Botsford Drive. Eleven fatalities occurred immediately, twenty triage-level Red and Yellow injuries resulted, and fifteen more triage-level Green injuries needed attention. Several units in the Westmoreland Union Manor senior living and Reed College Apartment complexes were rendered uninhabitable, displacing fourteen students and five senior citizens.
- Other debris sites spurred humanitarian, economic, and water contamination concerns. An additional nine Red and Yellow triage-level injuries, in combination with another sixteen Green triage-level injuries resulted from miscellaneous debris.




Figure 1. Approximate locations of damage associated with large pieces of debris

DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS

Evolving Response Organization

1. The complexity of the response to this type of event will require coordinated information sharing across jurisdictions and agencies.

Participants identified information sharing to develop a common operating picture (COP) from the initial notification through the investigation as a key priority. Participants mentioned a need to identify any hazardous materials onboard the plane; to determine whether utility services would be affected by any of the debris or incident response; and the necessity to process witness statements as examples of some their information sharing concerns. Participants noted that among their first priorities were activating a command structure and developing a COP. Clackamas Fire Department would take initial command and determine the size of the incident and the resources required for the response. Responders would request necessary mutual aid requirements and coordinate with regional response agencies to determine allocation of resources. Transportation of triage-level Red and Yellow casualties would also be a priority that will likely be addressed before a full command structure is established.

The participants agreed that establishing Unified Command (UC) quickly would be challenging due to overlapping response efforts across the jurisdictions. A Clackamas Battalion Chief would take initial command to determine the geographic magnitude of the response area before establishing an overall UC structure which will most likely not be present for at least the first hour. Based on the workshop scenario, incident command would be located in a Clackamas public safety building. The Portland Emergency Coordination Center (ECC) would host the Portland-specific UC, Disaster Policy Council, and county officials, if the jurisdictions involved in the emergency operations center (EOC) requested such resources.

A common understanding amongst participants was the need for formation of UC. It was decided that fire services would take the lead Incident Commander position until all fire and medical issues were resolved. From then on, law enforcement and investigation would take over while fire services would transition to a support position. Overall, the response objectives will drive the composition of the command structure.

Participants also identified that it would take a period of time before the various fire services involved realized they were responding to the same accident because there is no notification system and dispatching will not be unified.

2. The various response organizations must coordinate efforts to locate, deploy, and prioritize resources appropriately.

Due to the size of the debris field over multiple jurisdictions and the large number of agencies involved in a large-scale aviation accident response, competition for local resources is inevitable. During the initial response, the airline and emergency management agencies from Multnomah and Clackamas Counties will likely standup their respective family assistance centers (FAC) potentially duplicating efforts and drawing on the same pool of local translators and other specialized support personnel. Likewise, emergency medical services, fire, and law enforcement personnel will be stretched to their limits with the immediate response and securing multiple incident sites. Local first responder agencies may reach out to neighboring

counties and state agencies for additional resources to find those resources have already been deployed to another incident scene. In order to minimize competing demands for resources, the response agencies must work together. Under the UC structure, available resources can be appropriately deployed based on incident response priorities and individual local resource requests to state and federal agencies can be consolidated to support the regional response.

3. During the first few hours of the response, the scope and scale of the incident will be unclear.

Commercial aircraft accidents are not always apparent as soon as they happen. Various governmental bodies will need to start connecting the dots as information continues to become available. Orientation of the situation will be crucial because it will influence response to sub-incidents on the ground as well as whether evacuations will be recommended. Witnesses will help provide initial and additional information during the first hours of the response.

A large number of organizations will need to coordinate public messaging. Public information officers (PIOs) will need to communicate across jurisdictions to ensure that the various response agencies have a common understanding of the incident in order to deliver a consistent message. A joint information center (JIC) will need to be established quickly and staffed with stakeholder representatives in order to prevent the media from owning the message that is portrayed to the public.

The participants indicated that the best way to maintain control over public messaging and avoid competition for limited resources is to establish a unified area command to oversee the management of the multiple incident sites. Regional stakeholders also need to familiarize themselves with the existing Regional Joint Information System Concept of Operations Plan so responders may synchronize their response efforts and enhance their support of one another.

Airlines, upon receiving notification, will lock out the manifest and call the departure station to determine the passengers onboard the aircraft; however, there will typically be a delay of approximately one hour before the manifest is confirmed. Airlines will also provide any information regarding the presence of hazardous materials onboard the aircraft.

4. The presence of foreign nationals will add complexity to the evolving response organization.

The workshop scenario included passengers from South Korea, Japan, China, Spain, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. While English is often spoken throughout Asia and Europe, it is not the official spoken language of South Korea, Japan, China (outside of Hong Kong), nor of Spain. Response organizations should coordinate with various consulates and translators in anticipation of assisting family members and friends of victims who do not speak fluent English. The airline representatives present at the workshop explained that airlines often attempt to vet certain organizations that provide translators and sign language interpreters as a preparedness measure. Participants also noted that community connectors with capabilities in over 100 languages are available in the area to support the response.

Debris Management and Evidence Preservation

5. Responders defined their key priorities as life preservation and perimeter security followed by evidence preservation.

Participants noted that life preservation with respect to victims, responders, and the public is always the first priority and informs debris removal decisions. Following life preservation, establishing scene security within the first two hours of the response is a key priority and a necessary step for evidence preservation. As part of the long-term investigation, the secured area should be treated as a crime scene and all debris should be handled with appropriate care. Additionally, a nearby, indoor location should be secured, staffed and utilized for evidence collection.

Multiple people, organizations, and jurisdictions will be involved in debris management and evidence preservation activities. The initial identification and notification of the agencies necessary to manage the large amount of debris, some of which may be hazardous, and properly preserve evidence will be crucial. Representatives from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the NTSB will need to coordinate with local responders to access secured incident sites for investigation purposes. Regional representatives from the FAA and FBI will likely arrive on scene well before federal NTSB representatives and will be the primary agents coordinating with local responders to obtain situational awareness. Additional agencies will be requested to manage the presence of debris in the local waterways. The Coast Guard and/or the local sheriff may need to coordinate that effort, but Clackamas County does have water rescue resources that could help collect and hold debris in the water.

Participants stated the initial task will be to determine the extent of the debris field by locating the four points of the plane (nose, tail, two wing tips). An outer perimeter will then be established to manage the site, control media and people on the ground, and to facilitate emergency vehicle access. Incident stakeholders will need to establish clear lines of communication and establish a COP for debris management and evidence preservation for the incident. Precise definitions of roles and mission assignments for these entities will also need to be communicated early in the response. Establishment of an ongoing chain of custody over wreckage identification and documentation will be critical.

Volunteers through vetted community emergency response teams and neighborhood emergency teams may be helpful as force multipliers while conducting a grid search for debris. However, there is no regional plan to manage spontaneous volunteers who will need to be vetted. All volunteers should receive guidance not to touch debris and to clarify debris identification and reporting procedures. Similarly, public messaging will be required to inform the public not to interact with or move debris for evidence preservation purposes and to avoid possible exposure to hazardous materials. Public messaging should encourage reporting identified debris and provide a hotline or email dedicated to receiving and process these reports.

6. Development of a regional response plan for on-scene command will contribute to the overall success of response efforts.

In preparation for a large-scale incident that would affect multiple response agencies in the region, emergency response stakeholders from across the region should develop, train against, and exercise regional response plans. While a few regional response plans do exist, such as the Regional Joint Information System Concept of Operations Plan, opportunities exist to develop additional regional response plans to facilitate multi-agency/multi-jurisdictional coordination with pre-established memorandums of agreement and memorandums of understanding, clearly defined activation protocols, and current points of contact for stakeholder agencies.

Patient Tracking and Fatality Management

7. The ability to tag and track casualties and fatalities should be enhanced.

Participants were in agreement that patient tracking exemplifies a capability gap for the Portland and Milwaukie areas. The participants engaged in a lengthy discussion that began with an overview of initial priorities and response actions. There was a general understanding among the participants that initial priorities would be to establish a staging area and determine the patient count in order to triage casualties. Initially, only those patients that are loaded into and transported by ambulances will be tracked; individuals who self-dispatch to hospitals or walk into urgent care centers will not be tracked. Tracking injured children who may not be able to identify themselves will be of particular concern. A process needs to be established to notify parents or guardians of children within and around the debris field with frequent updates on family reunification procedures.

8. The incident's size, scope, and resulting infrastructure damage will add complexity to the mass casualty incident response.

The first objective the participants agreed upon was to confirm that an actual accident, rather than an exercise, had taken place. It was noted that a temporary flight restriction would probably be issued for the area and air assets would be used to improve the general understanding of the situation. A local impediment to this effort would be the heavy use of unmanned aerial vehicles that might endanger law enforcement helicopters.

Ingress and egress to accident scenes will likely present significant challenges. Law enforcement will be responsible for scene security. The Department of Transportation would identify closed or impassable roadways and help determine detour routes to guide the movement of emergency response equipment in and out of secured areas.

Patients would need to be transported and distributed amongst the 21 area hospitals in order to avoid overwhelming the capabilities of any one facility. It would be difficult for a single or just a few facilities to accommodate the influx of patients due to the number of casualties. A priority will be loading trauma hospitals first and then dispersing patients to other larger hospitals with greater capabilities. The Department of Health and Human Services Region X maintains close relationships with its state and federal partners and would offer support to those partners, if necessary.

9. Fatality management will be the responsibility of multiple organizations and will require coordination.

Due to the effects of a complete aircraft breakup, aircraft debris and human remains from passengers could end up in multiple jurisdictions and the situation would be compounded by fatalities on the ground. Several organizations and agencies are needed to support fatality management including medical examiner offices from the state and affected counties, the airline, and funeral homes. Personnel with medical expertise may be required to distinguish human remains from other debris on scene. As part of the regional response mass fatality capability, the region's mobile morgue will likely be deployed into the field. Teams comprised of representatives from state and county medical examiner offices will flag, photograph, collect, and label remains. To facilitate victim identification, personal property will be photographed and processed, X-rays taken, and DNA samples will be collected.

Medical examiners will need to verify the number of fatalities associated with the accident before releasing information to the public in order to avoid misinformation. Additionally, Title 49 U.S. Code § 41113 requires an air carrier whose aircraft has been in an accident that results in a major loss of life to provide a toll-free telephone number for the families of passengers to call in order to acquire accident-related information. Coordination between the medical examiners and the airline will be necessary to ensure only accurate information is shared with victim's families using the toll-free number.

Local funeral homes will be responsible for entering data for acquiring death certificates and reuniting bodies with families. If remains need to be transported outside of the region, local funeral homes will coordinate with funeral homes at the destinations and maintain communications with victims' families throughout this process.

10. The presence of foreign nationals will add complexity to the fatality-management mission.

The presence of foreign nationals may mean that victims are of different religions with different considerations for handling human remains. First responders, hospital staff, and medical examiners will need information on how to handle remains in accordance with religious beliefs and laws. Fortunately, the region has had great success working with consulates in the past. Medical examiners will coordinate with relevant consulates to deliver death notifications, as necessary.

The Department of State Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) will actively participate in the response if there are international victims involved and will have a representative in the FAC. Personnel from the OFM are trained specifically to appreciate cultural sensitivities and will facilitate communication regarding international passengers in the aftermath of an accident.

11. All partner agencies should be able to access and use WebEOC to develop a common operating picture and maintain situational awareness.

WebEOC will be used to facilitate patient tracking in the region. It is an especially useful tool for developing situational awareness during the initial incident response when information sharing between response agencies on scene is impeded due to time-sensitive priorities to save lives and secure the incident site. Keeping responders well trained to use WebEOC, however, is a constant challenge. Delivering initial training and refresher training to relevant personnel

on WebEOC is an expensive and time-consuming process. Despite these challenges, ensuring all response agencies have access to and are familiar with using WebEOC is necessary to enhance situational awareness and patient tracking capabilities amongst regional response agencies.

Family Assistance and Public Communications

12. Notification of friends and family members of victims onboard the aircraft is an initial priority.

An initial family center should be set up in an airline lounge area in order to provide accommodations to friends and family members already at the airport. Capacity issues and overwhelming crowds at the airline counters are always cause for concern in scenarios such as this one. However, a space within the lower D level of PDX has already been designated for these purposes.

A post-security center will also be stood up to house the vetting process conducted by the airline to ensure those in the family center are the individuals who truly require assistance. The use and extent of a vetting process will be at the discretion of the airline involved. The “No Fly” list will not be vetted and cleared for the purposes of allowing individuals through to the family center; however, airport security will need to remain a priority. It is most likely that additional Transportation Security Administration (TSA) officers will be brought in to assist. TSA managers will decide whether to permit individuals who have different last names than victims into the family center. During a previous drill, no screening occurred at all; rather, badged employees escorted family according to an existing PDX plan.

Each airline will have its own customized form to provide to family and friends of victims for their completion. Meanwhile, the American Red Cross (ARC) will serve as a liaison between the friends/family of victims and the airline. A core priority of the ARC will be to organize resources to address the behavioral health needs of the friends and family of victims.

13. Coordination of information is the key responsibility of the public information officers.

The first actions of the PIOs will be to refer to the Portland Metropolitan Region Emergency Public Information Concept of Operations Plan¹ and to locate the Incident Commander in order to coordinate public messaging. Coordination should occur both in-person at the JIC and virtually. The Oregon Virtual Operations Support Team (VOST)², managed by the Oregon Office of Emergency Management, will immediately begin monitoring social media following the accident. Local PIOs will need to coordinate with the airline spokesperson to ensure consistent messaging across all entities using multiple communication methods.

14. The different public information missions of the JIC and the FAC were not clearly understood by many participants.

While both the JIC and the FAC issue information to the public, the goal and audiences of their respective public information missions differ. Response personnel should receive a high-level

¹ <http://www.portlandoregon.gov/rdpo/article/561118>

² <https://oregonvost.com>

overview of the JIC and the FAC in order to knowledgeably coordinate with both entities as necessary. The JIC will manage the flow of information and the coordination of public messaging related to the incident response. The JIC will be concerned with managing social media, rumors, and false headlines and ensuring public information is available in multiple languages. The JIC is also responsible for managing media press conferences which feature question and answer sessions as well as airline comments. The NTSB will require the JIC to be operational until the damage assessment is officially complete. However, the JIC may continue operations until all official visits are finalized and funerals are completed, which may take several weeks. Response personnel should refer to the Portland Metropolitan Region Emergency Public Information Concept of Operations Plan, as precise operations will vary based on the scope and scale of the incident.

The FAC serves the specific information needs of the families and friends of accident victims. As opposed to the JIC which is staffed primarily by public information officers from first responder agencies, FAC personnel are comprised of representatives from the airline, the ARC, as well as emergency management professionals. Additionally, translators may be required at the FAC to communicate with family members of international passengers. The FAC provides information regarding available assistance and specific updates regarding victims and their personal belongings. The ARC often also serves as a liaison between families and the airline, and will relay information to the public on behalf of the families.

15. The international nature of the incident causes complications in family assistance.

The U.S. Department of State can supplement response efforts when foreign nationals are involved in an incident. Airlines are required by law (Title 49 U.S. Code § 41113) to provide a passenger manifest to the appropriate authorities. Once authorities have identified the foreign nationals on the manifest, the OFM will reach out to the relevant consulates to coordinate support for their family and friends. A representative from OFM may also be deployed to support efforts at the FAC.

Airline “CARE” Team or Crisis Response Team members may support the FAC and/or reunion center and are trained to sensitively assist foreign nationals affected by the incident. CARE Teams have existing contracts with several local language service companies to facilitate assistance with non-English speaking family members. The ARC also has a language line to identify people to assist with translations. If necessary, the airline will contact other federal agencies and the EOC in order to locate additional resources.

After reviewing this report, participants attended a virtual After-Action Meeting to validate the issues listed and to suggest possible solutions at the local, state, and federal levels. This discussion is documented in the following section.

AFTER-ACTION MEETING SUMMARY

Workshop stakeholders met on December 13, 2016 for a virtual After-Action Meeting to clarify input from various functional areas. The After-Action Meeting focused on validating the draft outcomes and ensuring the summary report clearly and accurately articulated the findings in an effort to minimize confusion due to the unique terminology and focus of the various functional areas assembled during the workshop. The After-Action Meeting participants hope the outcomes of the meeting resulted in a final summary report that is clear to all reviewers across all supporting disciplines.

APPENDIX A: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

The following jurisdictions and organizations participated in the workshop.

State Jurisdictions

- State of Oregon
 - Oregon Department of Aviation
 - Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
 - Oregon Department of Justice TITAN Fusion Center
 - Oregon Department of Transportation
 - Oregon Health Authority
 - Oregon Military Department Office of Emergency Management
 - Oregon National Guard
 - Oregon State Police
- State of Washington
 - Washington State Emergency Management Division

Local Jurisdictions and Departments

- City of Beaverton, Oregon
- City of Gresham, Oregon
 - Gresham Police Department
- City of Hillsboro, Oregon
 - Hillsboro Fire and Rescue
 - Hillsboro Police Department
- City of Lake Oswego, Oregon
 - Lake Oswego Fire Department
- City of Milwaukie, Oregon
 - Milwaukie Police Department
- City of Portland
 - Office of Commissioner Steve Novick
 - Portland Bureau of Emergency Communications
 - Portland Bureau of Emergency Management
 - Portland Bureau of Environmental Services
 - Portland Bureau of Transportation
 - Portland Fire and Rescue

- Portland Police Bureau
- Portland Neighborhood Emergency Teams (NET)
- Portland Transportation Traffic
- Clackamas County, Oregon
 - Clackamas County Fire Department
 - Clackamas County Medical Examiner's Office
 - Clackamas County Office of Disaster Management
- Clark County, Washington
 - Clark County Regional Emergency Services Agency
- Multnomah County, Oregon
 - Multnomah County Health Department
 - Multnomah County Human Services
 - Multnomah County Medical Examiner's Office
 - Multnomah County Office of Diversity and Equity
 - Multnomah County Office of Emergency Management
 - Multnomah County Sheriff's Office
- Port of Portland, Oregon
 - Port of Portland Airport Operations
 - Port of Portland
 - Port of Portland Emergency Management
 - Port of Portland Police Department
- Regional Disaster Preparedness Organization (RDPO)
- Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon (TRIMET)
- Washington County, Oregon
 - Washington County Emergency Medical Services
 - Washington County Medical Examiner's Office
 - Washington County Office of Emergency Management

Private-sector and Nongovernmental Organizations and Associations

- Airport Terminal Services
- Alaska Airlines
- American Airlines
- American Medical Response

- American Red Cross
- Frontier Airlines
- Intel Corporation
- Jet Blue Airlines
- Metro
- Metro West Ambulance
- Northwest Emergency Management Education Consortium
- Northwest Natural
- Oregon Funeral Directors Association
- Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU) Hospital
- Pacific General Electric
- Providence Health and Services
- Spirit Airlines
- Sun Country Airlines
- United Airlines
- Virgin America Airlines
- Volaris Airlines

Federal Departments and Agencies

- National Transportation Safety Board
- National Counterterrorism Center
- Oregon Federal Executive Board
- U.S. Department of Defense
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Region X
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security
 - Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region X
 - National Exercise Division
 - Office of Counterterrorism and Security Preparedness
 - Transportation Security Administration
 - U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. Department of Justice
 - Federal Bureau of Investigation, Portland

- U.S. Department of State
 - Office of Foreign Missions
- U.S. Department of Transportation, Region X
 - Federal Aviation Administration
- U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
 - Portland VA Medical Center

APPENDIX B: PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK

Average Participant Experience 4.1¹



Most Valuable

- The workshop benefitted from well-rounded participation and strong facilitation;
- The scenario was robust, well-presented, and contained a rich depth of content;
- The NTSB presentation was highly informative;
- Airliner participation both added to the quality of the workshop and provided insight into their resources and roles;

- *"This was one of the best workshops I've attended in my 18-year career. Great team of instructors!"*

To Improve


- Develop a list of key terms and acronyms to avoid gaps in communication;
- Increase the opportunity to interact between breakout groups;
- Acquire a method to access participant contact information to continue discussions from the workshop;
- Incorporate past events and case studies to help provide context and guide discussion;

"An email option to self-select breakout group ahead of time might have been advisable"

Participant Feedback on Course Value

- "The broad spectrum of individuals across many disciplines and areas of expertise lent itself to valuable discussions." - Anonymous
- "The guided discussions were productive and useful for the scenario" – State Agency
- "The training was excellent for the allotted time frame" – Local Agency
- "Good job. It exceeded my expectations" – Local Agency

Distribution of Attendees



¹Min. 2.17/Max 5.00 (Field: 1-5)